De-scribing Theology

Here is the second of four engagements around Pete Rollins' How (Not) to Speak of God.  It is by Christopher Roussel, who currently lives in Denver, CO and is pursuing a Master's degree in Religious Studies at the University of Denver.  Christopher can also be found at impleri.

Download rollins_hntsog.pdf

The disaster, unexperienced.  It is what escapes the very possibility of experience—it is the limit of writing.  This must be repeated: the disaster de-scribes.  Which does not mean that the disaster, as the force of writing, is excluded from it, is beyond the pale of writing or extratextual.
Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster

In the introduction to his book, Pete Rollins mentions that "the only people who seemed to be taking this subject [the mystical approach] seriously were the supposedly nihilistic postmodern philosophers" (p xiii).  In many ways, this is exactly the current situation in theological discourses.  Is it even possible to find a seminary/divinity school/school of theology/whatever it is that produces theologians that espouses a "traditional," "orthodox" theology while also engaging with either the mystical approach or the postmodern philosophers?  I know that I haven't been able to find one that actively claims such a position.  With that in mind, I thought it would be worthwhile to highlight/point out/draw connections between Rollins and some of the postmodern philosophers.  I am not sure how accurate these connections truly are (i.e. I'm not sure Rollins will agree with me), but I see similarities in How (Not) to Speak of God and two philosophers in particular Jack Caputo and Mark C. Taylor.  So, I think we have here some good groups of thought that will be painted together to give a more robust picture of what Rollins throws into the term of "heretical orthodoxy."

A/theology isn't something new.  Mark C. Taylor seems to have first used the word in 1982 and subsequently used in his title for his 1984 book Erring: A Postmodern A/theology.  The term combines the words "theology" and "atheism" to get a definition that floats around "we must still speak of God (theology, as traditionally understood) while also recognizing that this speech fails to define God (a/theology)" (p 21). Ultimately, this leads to a separation between what some (many?) now call onto-theology and this "new" discourse (cf Merold Westphal, John Caputo, & James Marsh in Modernity and its Discontents, Westphal's Overcoming Onto-theology, and Stan Grenz's The Named God and the Question of Being, to name a few).  I use "new" rather loosely because the proponents of a/theology suggest that they are returning to the pre-Enlightenment, pre-Medieval theology that had been distorted through those two ages.  Through this rejection of a "view from nowhere," Rollins and others (re)paints theology/revelation as concealment in which God reveals God through a mystical/experiential way.

One of the primary foci in this a/theology movement is that of the event.  The main point of this foci is that to conceive of God as some Be-ing1--as some ontological entity.  Caputo writes in his Weakness of God (WoG for short) that by rejecting this depiction of God as a being, he "disconnects the energy source that supplies power to the debate about whether there is or is not an entity called God somewhere, up above or here below, inside or outside, here and now or up ahead" (p 10).  By this dis-connection, we are able to appreciate more fully Zizek's theory in The Puppet and the Dwarf that"what we should learn from his [Jesus'] death on the cross is that there is no Big Other to save us" (WoG, 43) because there is no thing to be a Big Other.  There is no ontological entity beyond what we already experience because God is not a being.  To put this in highly radical terms, "there is no God"--because there is no God to be.  This idea may also paint another interpretation of Jesus' crucifixion: it was an end to onto-theology.  Jesus, as the only ontological instantiation of God, dies and removes the possibility of an ontological God.  This may not be something Rollins is actively pursuing, but his statement that "speaking of God is never speaking of God but only ever speaking about our understanding of God" (p 32) has this in its trajectory.  This redefining of God as an event cleans up many dilemmas currently facing theology (e.g. the problem of evil, omniscience and future actions, self-certainty in orthodoxy), but also creates new problems.

Easter an important part of theology and one of these problems.  "Classical" theologians seemed to have tossed aside half of it (that God dies) for the other (that Jesus rose again).  Mark C. Taylor notes in Erring that at the cross, "not only God dies; the self also disappears" (p 33).  This comes as a conclusion to a brief look at Nietzsche's "death of God" and project of nihilism in which Taylor draws heavily on Derrida.  Taylor uses Derrida (in Writing and Difference) to interpret Heidegger by saying: "God is this the proper name of that which deprives us of our nature, of our own birth; consequently he will always have spoken before us, on the sly.  He is the difference which insinuates itself between myself and myself as death" (p 23).  By experiencing God through the cross, one experiences not only the death of God but also the death of one's self.  That is, this experience leads one face to face with one's own "extraneousness to himself" (Lacan, Language of the Self, 136).  Here, we can begin to see theology as an "interplay of presence/absence and identity/difference" (Erring 15).  It is through this interplay that one can affirm Rollins when he writes "[i]f one loses one's life only because one believes that this is the way to find it, then one gives up nothing; to truly lose one's life, one must lay down that life without regard to whether or not one finds it" (p 34).  This trajectory through Rollins, Derrida, and Taylor give us a twist on Heidegger: it is through this acknowledgment of the death of God and self that authenticity is revealed and we find genuine Christianity.  Here, we can acknowledge, in Zizek's words, the "dark underbelly of Christianity" because we are able to look at the crucifixion for what it is in it's moments: the death of God and the subsequent death of the self.  Hence we can find in Vattimo, "salvation is an event in which kenosis, the abasement of God, is realized more and more fully and so undermines the wisdom of the world, the metaphysical dreams of natural reason which conceive God as absolute, omnipotent and transcendent, as ipsum esse (metaphysicum) subsistens (Belief, 49-50).  In other words, a/theology is a soteriological event that "understands that God is testified to in the transformed lives of believers rather than in some abstract doctrinal system" (Rollins, 40).

It is through this trajectory of stringing together theology and postmodern philosophy that we find the trajectory towards a "new" theology.

1 Here, I want to allude to Heidegger in his Besinnung (Band 66 of Heidegger's Complete Works, H11-H12) in which he relates the clearing of Be-ing with the Being of insanity.  While there is a hot-off-the-press English translation (Mindfulness), this  particular translation was done by me in 2004.

Comments

[Christopher Roussel]

i have to apologise ahead of time if this doesn't go as in-depth as some may have liked. As i was writing, over and over, i felt a lack of knowledge, especially with Caputo's work. i do hope that this gloss at least gets a conversation going.

[Jason Hesiak]

Uuuhhh...wow...One thing...thanks for answering (partially) my probably-dumb question about who Westphal is from the comments to the last post, stirred by Peter's comment about Westphal concerning man's incapacity for full reception of the Revelation due to "a hermeneutics of finitude and of sin".

Also, does anyone else find it ironic that we find ourselves SOMEWHERE again when we "reject a 'view from nowhere'"...in attempting an "a/theology" and REJECTING an onto-theology through which we managed to construct this "view from nowhere" that was coupled with a funny "empricism"? How is it that that that sentence actually makes sense and accurately describes our histroy (because to me it does both of those things)?

Anwyay...particularly relevant I think to my working in and through actual MEDIUMS as an architect, and, I think, to Marc Taylor's talk of appearance (surface) and depth (what's underneath) in his book Hiding. "At this point...in this point, the body is deprived of its substance and is on the verge of disappearing. The missing body sets in motion a detective story - in all of its (dis)guises." I haven't quite figured out HOW this funny situation comes about, but that's the way it seems to be. Does anyone have The Mystery To A Solution (John T. Irwin) (not too tight and rigorous, I don't think, but relevant)? :)

Also...thank you again. I know someone who left the church simply because he couldn't "handle the idea of" a God who knows in advance that people are gong to Hell. I thought to myself, "Wait...but...no, uuhhh...not the 'point'! Oh, I wish I could explain to this guy this notion in my soul of how his problem would nearly vanish if he understood how its rooted in a construct of [I suppose Medieval and] Enlightenment thought! No no no, it's NOT like that!" Also, in a sense almost funnily, his brother gave to me as a gift once a book that, through emprical science, explored the "wonders of the human body that was made by God" (I kinda' feel bad for not having finished that book). Anwyay, I was unable to continue my line of thought any further or speak to this guy the deep tension in my soul. I have a long ways to go (to where?); but you guys are awsome and very helpful! God bless,

Jason

P.S. - Arond the time of my Dad's death, and a long while after, my favorite verse was "For ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God." I am curious to hear what Peter might say about this death of God/death of self stuff...

[Jason Hesiak]

Oh, and by "finding ourselves SOMEWHERE" i was partially referring to: "Through this rejection of a 'view from nowhere,' Rollins and others (re)paints theology/revelation as concealment in which God reveals God through a mystical/experiential way." By "somewhere" I wasn't I don't think referring directly to anythything Chris said, but more I think something sort of implicit. Just so I don't confuse anyone...

[Christopher Roussel]

Hi Jason,
i think the point of "rejecting a 'view from nowhere'" wants to imply that we are somewhere. By acknowledging that we are "somewhere" (and not "nowhere"), we're acknowledging our limits (due to our subjectivity) and go from there. Through that acknowledging, we can begin to understand our filters/lens/weltanschauung/whatever-you-want-to-call-it and thus gain further insight into us. i see it as a self-reflective evaluation, not a means by which we may remove our filters/etc and get to that Absolute Knowledge.

[Jason Hesiak]

I'm with you, bro...minus the reference to "weltanschauung" (never heard that term...at least not that I remember), you pretty much just said exactly what I meant. As an Architect, I strongly identify with the following from one of my favorite archtiects: ""The thought that a system could become the material refuge in which architecture protects itself against the negative effects of wonder and alienation has come to nought. The desire for total domination of space, has proved impossible. The desire to integrate in its own presumed totality a light that can only come from outside is the hubris upon which every system has perished. Architecture as life is perhaps impossible without some system, but Hejduk's architecture is not dealing with unambiguous facts or with serial information. Rather it is fired with a resistance to and separation from a dubious kind of order, without making a system out of this very resistence..." - Daniel Libeskind, p. 16, intro. to Mask of Medusa, by John Hejduk.

That doesn't directly relate to what you said, I suppose, but I think your reference to Absolute Knowledge is easily translated into the architectural world (or any other world) of system building. Hence my quote...simply to say I'm with you.

Does it sound like I'm missing something? I don't want to impose myself upon your world by saying I'm with you, if you don't feel the same way...it's obvious to me, for example that you have been exposed to much more philosophy and/or theology and their history than I, but I think I got what you're saying.

Anyway, God bless,

Jason

[Jonathan Erdman]

In the introduction to his book, Pete Rollins mentions that "the only people who seemed to be taking this subject [the mystical approach] seriously were the supposedly nihilistic postmodern philosophers" (p xiii). In many ways, this is exactly the current situation in theological discourses. Is it even possible to find a seminary/divinity school/school of theology/whatever it is that produces theologians that espouses a "traditional," "orthodox" theology while also engaging with either the mystical approach or the postmodern philosophers?

My problem with the so-called "traditional" theologians of our time is that their theology and philosophy does not easily lend itself to subjective engagement. Theology/philosophy are objects to be analyzed apart from any true impact upon the soul.
Take the issue of "truth" as an example. "Truth" is construed as a correspondence between proposition and reality. Fine. I have no problems with that. But when we get to the Gospel of John truth takes on many forms, some of which are only called "truth" (aletheia) b/c of their impact on the subject. I find "truth" in the Fourth Gospel to be a mixture of objective and subjective elements. A more traditional theologian/philosopher like Moreland would surely call this a confusion on the part of the Gospel of John.

Also crf. Kierkegaard's subject/object distinction.

[maninthepew]

Hello Chris,

thank you for your lucid introduction to get this discussion going. imho there are many conservative theologians engaging with postmodern philosphy- Radical Orthodoxy( Millbank, Ward and Pistock) postmetaphysical theology (Marion and de Certeau)and postliberal theology (Lindbeck) schools of theology come to mind. I think these theologians come from a variety of confessional backgrounds - Lutheran, Catholic and Anglican -yet all interact and engage with
postmodern philosphers and at times mystical discourse in their theological work.

As regards mystical discourse- Turner,McGinn,McIntosh, Rowan Williams and Davies all have written books on the recent historical/critical scholarship of classic mystics and their texts and also discussed how negative theology/mystical discourse impacts contemporary theology and church practice.

[Christopher Roussel]

Hi Jason,
i don't think you're "missing something," i had just wanted to clarify things without posing a question. Thanks!
Hi man,
Thank you for your comments. i don't disagree that there are _specific_ theologians interacting with postmodernism, but i have yet to see a seminary (e.g. Duke Divinity, etc) engage it at an institutional level. The closest i have seen is Trinity's Seminary with D.A. Carson, but i don't think they're truly engaging the postmodern philosophers (instead, they're reacting to a pop-postmodernism that they equate with relativism). i agree that there are "orthodox" theologians interacting with postmodernism (such as Milibank, Ward, Westphal, Franke, etc), but there's two difficulties: (1) the instutions where these guys are situated (such as Biblical Seminary for Franke) doesn't push for this engagement and (2) quite a number of theologians where these guys come from would not consider them in good standing (and i think this is related closely with #1).
i remember in January where a certain school in the Dallas area issued a statement suggesting that anyone who is associated with Carl Raschke would find themselves in a position where they should think about not returning to that school. Now, Carl isn't some big demon hiding around the corner that's publishing a new heresy every other month (as some may paint McLaren), nor is he much more radical than someone like Caputo or Taylor (from my conversations with Carl), but that was enough for at least one faculty member to not have his contract renewed. This seems to be becoming more and more fashionable in the American Protestant Evangelical world, which i fear may cause major problems in the future. Separationism never fares well when done for maintaining a static set of propositions that become a theology/hermeneutics/etc.

Thanks,
Christopher

[maninthepew]

Hello Chris,

I'm a middle aged full time civil servant living in a completely different cultural situation - Northern Ireland !!!!Your comments about American seminaries etc are very interesting! There is a whole debate going on if deconstructionist philosphers have not completely misread/misinterpreted the negative theology of many mystics which makes many of their assumptions very suspect. Could you say a bit more why modern orthodox theology has not engaged with the mystical discourse/approach (I can see your point as regards postmodern philosphy)

[Jason Hesiak]

Chris, thanks for the clarification.
Jason

[maninthepew]

Hello all,

If we take the idea of Derridas supposed linguistic idealism (there is nothing outside of language) then all our ideas of the reality of God are social and cultural constructions - language is transcendence. A form of Christian atheism emerges-it absolutises transcendental lack, absence and nothingness (such might characterise death of god theologians).
The only relevance of Christ for today is as a moral teacher.

I think Pete would say the God is beyond every assertion of being or absence (he would reject any absolutising of Absence as well as Presence and wish to avoid defining God in either atheistic or theistic terms) - this is I think one key difference between Pete and Taylor.
As for Caputo - that is another story.

3 posts from me is enough !!!!!!!!!!!!!! Anyone else like to comment

Jason,
good to see you back on board

Rodney aka man in the pew

[Jason Hesiak]

Rodney,

I'm glad you're glad I'm back on board, but honetly at this point I just want to listen myself. I think I did enough talking in the last 89 comment conversation! I would, however, be curious (anyone?) to hear more about this academic cultural situation here in America in regards to the issues in this post/conversatin series. I am considering entering that Academic cultural situation...but if it isn't worth it...?? Thoughts rummaging in the Duder's head as a result of what's been said here...

Jason

[Christopher Roussel]

Hi Rodney,
i think the reason why American orthodoxy hasn't engaged with the mystics is similar to their lack of engagement with the philosophers. It seems to me that the negative theology of the mystics take a "neither/nor" approach (as opposed to the more familiar "both/and"), and this has been misinterpreted as rejecting some crucial doctrine somewhere in someone's five volume systematic theology. Yet this is what Taylor suggests there's an interview on the Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory -- http://www.jcrt.org/ -- in 2002 where he says so explicitly) in clarifying what he means by being "truly radical" in _Erring_. To be truly radical, one must reject both options as they are both bad attempts at describing the indescribable. i think this is similar to what Pete suggests in his "heretical orthodoxy."
Also, i don't think Derrida would hold to language being transcedental. But, regardless of Derrida, Caputo definitely rejects this because he suggests that the very Absense of something is its Presence. For example, when one is at a funeral, the deceased is totally Absent, but yet has some kind of actualized Presence. i haven't read enough of Derrida, but i think this takes his idea of the trace to its extreme end. Yet, it is also the case that this is remarkably different from the death of God theologians (such as Altizer). Taylor makes it a point that he is separating from his earlier teacher (Altizer) in the death of God movement and its (mis)interpretation of Nietzsche.

[Andy]

Chris,

I attended Biblical about several years ago - and unless something has changed - the seminary was moving in the direction of engaging postmodernity very seriously. There were those that didn't like it I suspect - but I think the leadership was on board with the shift.

That said - I agree with the statement that most seminaries in the US seem to critique postmodernity rather than engage it...

Andy

[Jason Hesiak]

Andy, what Seminary/shool did you attend? Thanks,
Jason

[Andy]

Jason - Biblical Seminary in Hatfield, PA - just outside of Philadelphia.

a-

[maninthepew]

Hi Chris,

I agree with you comment about Derrida. I added the word 'supposed' as I was trying to say that the death of God
theologians misinterpreted early Derrida as saying there was nothing outside of the text to add weight to their own theology.

I have not read Taylor so I cannot comment on his work. I have spent many cups of coffee accusing Pete of being a nihilist (which he denied!!!) because of his admiration for Caputo. Pete can be a slippery eel to understand sometimes. As this discussion is about Caputo as well I will post my thoughts in a couple of days if no-one else does (I do not wish to hog the board).

Rodney aka maninthe pew

[maninthepew]

To all,
One last post to-day I promise -

The idea of the event being indescribable, beyond being, oustide of doctrines etc etc to me makes it so vague and abstract as to be in danger of becoming a meaningless absurdity!

- in my teens I became a very enthusiastic supporter of Man Utd : does fidelity to his event mean that I buy all the tickets for their home matches and longing be interpreted as I wish them to win the league title!!!!

- Recently I became very excited about investing money in stocks and shares: does fidelity to this event mean I borrow lots of money,go into debt and buy more shares or longing for the event mean that I look foward to making a quick buck buying and selling shares.

Are both of these events divine? Are they from God?
Are they about God? I could argue they are and since the "event" is beyond definition no-one could deny it.

As the funeral anology breaks down to me as I have a memory and knowledge of the presence of the dead woman in the past to inform my mourning. Her actualised sense of presence/absence is based on the memories of when I said and talked to her in the past. Surely we need to have an experience of something first to describe it in these terms (Maybe I am missing the point).

How does a religion without religions concept of "event"
be recognised/decribed in everyday life or is it so a vague concept that it sounds sexy in philosphical discussion but becomes meaningless in its application to lived experience?

I have not studied theology/philosphy so my points lack depth - sorry for length of the post ( I got carried away)

It would be great to hear from other people!!!!!!!!!!!!

Rodney

[Pete R]

Hey all. Really enjoyed the article and think that the comparison with Taylor and Caputo is astute (both of which I value as great writers in their field), as well as Zizek. I have to add however my indebtedness to a little Marion as well (just to balance things off a little – or rather show the two extremes of my personality)! You definitely pick up on a trajectory within my work which I think was slightly veiled. My work is largely phenomenological, but of course influenced by the turn to religion within this field. This means that I have listened intently to Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Freud and Marx, though, like the later Taylor (before he turned from religion entirely) reject the death of God theologians reading of these figures.

But all this may cloud the main reason for the book, which, as you point out, is not to engage in serious philosophical reflection (something I enjoy). Rather it was written to help transform church praxis by showing how the radical work happening in the universities can influence the radical life of the church and visa versa. On a personal note I started Ikon at the same time that I started my Phd, the reason was to create a place in which community life could enrich my theoretical output and my research could be embodied in community. After all, ‘philosophers have only interpreted the world in so many ways, the point however is to change it’ :)

[Jason Hesiak]

"As the funeral anology breaks down to me as I have a memory and knowledge of the presence of the dead woman in the past to inform my mourning. Her actualised sense of presence/absence is based on the memories of when I said and talked to her in the past. Surely we need to have an experience of something first to describe it in these terms (Maybe I am missing the point)."

Uuhh...from what I got that pretty much WAS the point of the funeral analogy, but I haven't read Caputo, nor much Derrida, so I shush now...? And I don't know enough about the "death of God theologians" and Taylor's break from xyz either...

[Geoff Holsclaw]

"the Presence of the Absent One" seems to be a persistent theme so far.

The funeral analogy which has been deployed (by Caputo) makes me think strongly of Freud and the 'death of the Father' in his thought. While alive, the father rules from outside harshly, but when he dies, the Law of the Father comes back twice as strong. Hence, only in the father's absence is his utter overbearing presence felt. This of course is meant to make sense of how our ancenstors are always with us.

I bring this up because I feel that there are many other resources for expressing the dialetic of absence and presences than those limned by postmodern philosophers. Cultural anthropologists and psychoanalysis (I'm thinking of Mauss and Lacan) are able to articulate this dialetic without making language a prison house of death.

[Geoff Holsclaw]

Pete,

thanks for jumping in. I'm sure that you don't want to be too committed to what Christopher outlined above, but your recent comment seems to endorse much of their views and trajectories. Reading through your book myself I also felt many of these theme (prominently from Caputo), and I was always asking myself, "Does Rollins mean the same thing? Because if he does, then while appreciating the pastoral need swim in these water, I feel I have point out they might rather toxic after too long. But maybe he means something else but could express it in order to keep the book focused."

So I guess, from last week to this week, my question is: Are you pretty much in line with Caputo? And if not, how are you different?

I ask all of this because, again, I realize that the point of the book is to skate on the line between pastoral praxis and theological philosophy, and while being easily able to affirm the pastoral importance of exploring doubt and death in connection with the work of Christ (and that most evangelical fundamentalists have no idea what that might mean), I'm hesitant to endorse the philosophical side.

And I'm nearly positive that you, Pete, don't just want to be read as a practical/pragmatic theologian, but a philosopher, so I feel that philosophical questions and answers are appropriate.

[Pete R]

Hey Geoff

I can understand your concerns and I definitely want to see myself in the tradition of philosophy. When I say that I enjoy the work of Caputo and Taylor I primarily mean that I enjoy the way that they write and that they inspire me to think in different ways, having said that much of Caputo’s work resonates very deeply with me. However, it all depends on how you read him, for instance I don’t endorse the reading of Caputo that people like Smith suggest. I guess, if you wanted to boil me down to something at this point in my life I would say that I am crying out for a return to the voice of God after the death of God.

My PhD thesis was entitled ‘His Colour is our Blood: A phenomenology of the Prodigal Father’ and was an attempt to describe this return. However this is NOT the same as the Death of God theologians – whose God was one of depth (located in the in-human) rather than of height (the infinite). The death of God for me is, of course, the death of the onto-theological God and thus the end of God as Being or as highest being. However, I am with Pascal insomuch as I don’t think that the death of the onto-theological God necessarily means that the metaphysical construal of God is illogical (I was schooled in Scholastic philosophy as an undergrad and have some sympathy here). Like Marion I would say that the God without being is not (necessarily) a God without existence. I think that the ‘death of God’ is less of a theological or philosophical critique and more of a sociological one. Well, that needs unpacked a little more before I would stand by it, but what I am getting at is that onto-theology gets us nowhere (can’t argue from the sky and birds to God as the Great Dane would say), aims in the wrong direction (does not look at the real object of Christian theology – the Christian, as Heidegger might say) and lacks transformative power.

Gotta run

[rodney neill]

Still cannot figure out how we are supposed to connect with an unknown god who might/not be there in an indefinable event that can mean anything you want it to mean although as long as it transforms you in a dramatic manner so that you make it the focus of your life and wish it to come back again.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

I need a light bulb to switch on in my head - I don't get it!

Geoff,Jason,Adrian,Chris,Pete - it has been a great but ultimately for me too fustrating conversation.

adios,

Rodney

[Geoff Holsclaw]

thanks pete,

at least for me, this has been clarifying. 

you say, " think that the ‘death of God’ is less of a theological or philosophical critique and more of a sociological one" (although you reserve the right to qualify it later).  I feel the same way about which is why i'm been making a distinction between pastoral theology and philosophical theology (which of course can/should be deconstructed).  It seems to me that the church (behind the pulpit and the lecture) has not done a sufficient job allowing for existential/personal doubt within the walk of faith.  "Death of God" theologies in a sense is a type of therapy for overcoming this neglect.  This symptoms of this illness (needing the therapy of death of God discourse) stem from the Enlightnements banishment of doubt on the path toward certainty, not from an ancient synthesis on Greek philosophy and Christian theology.   But you have to be careful because, afterall, chemotherapy will kill you even if in the hopes of curing you. 

Concerning Caputo, et al.  You say you read C. in a light that makes him less critical of christian theology, and I guess that is a matter of textual analysis.  As I've read him it seems difficult to come up with things like the Apostles Creed without Caputo jumping around claiming that we had done some violence to something or another, and I don't think God needs protection from our violent words as Caputo suggest.  But I guess that is another matter.

You commented briefly on scholastic theology, but what about the Church Fathers.  Would you categorize their work as falling mostly within an Onto-theological project, capitulation go Greek metaphysics as many deconstructive theorists do?

and I will say again, we a great affirmation, that, "Yes!  I too long for the transformative power of Truth to be unleashing, and that our concepts/thought/presuppositions ought not to bind, but rather release God's work in the world."

[Christopher Roussel]

Hi all!
Andy, you are right that Biblical Sem is moving towards engaging pomo philosophy, but as you said, it's an extreme rarity.

Rodney, i am not sure if we are thinking the same thing with "event." i am thinking along the lines of Badiou in _Saint Paul_ (i haven't yet read _Being and Event_, which is his greater explication of the Event) whereby an event ""interrupts the previous regime of discourses" and "what happens to us" (p 48). Of course, this is also echoed in Deleuze's _Logic of Sense_ (what he calls singularities): "Singularities are turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers; points of fusion, condensation, and boiling; points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, 'sensitive' points. Such singularities, however, should not be confused either with the personality of the one expressing herselfe in discoruse, or with the individuality of a state of affairs designated by a propositions, or even with the generality or universality of a concept signified by a figure or a curve. The singularity belongs to another dimension than that of denotation, manifestation, or signification. It is essentially pre-individual, non-personal, and a-conceptual" (p 52).
Also, i don't think it is necessary that a "vague, unknown" God equates with a "whatever you want" God. God is only "vague and unknown" from a propositional standpoint. God can't be reduced to a single, consistent definition. But, that doesn't mean God becomes "whatever you want." God is something that is experienced...and one experience may differ from another, yet there is some singularity to them all. Look at the Bible: we have a God who knew Jeremiah before he was formed in the womb, yet didn't know that humans would be so bad (e.g. the Flood, the golden calf, Sodom and Gomorrah, Nineveh, etc). i think the problem (if any) one will find in the previous sentence has to do mroe with our language than with what i said. One may interpret both halves as relating to the same thing (i.e. knowledge), but i am trying my hardest to use what is called in German a "separable prefix verb." That is, "to know" is different from "to know that," even though the difference is only one word ("that"). There is a qualitative difference in that i was using "to know" in a "know what" sense instead of a "know that." To put my point more bluntly: the rejection of onto-theology is, in my opinion, a rejection of propositional, systematic theology (which is based on a Cartesian foundationalist epistemology). In place of that comes a theology of the experiential/phenomenological where a systematic definition is impossible, even though there should be some kind of systematic methodology (i.e. let's use xyz to mean ___ and nothing else).

Pete, i didn't pick up on the Marion because i haven't read *any* of him (yet!).

Ciao,
Christopher

[Jason Hesiak]

"I think that the ‘death of God’ is less of a theological or philosophical critique and more of a sociological one." The first time I ever read Neitche's death of God proclomation in the living room of my fundamentalist good friend...this was the way I read it...and I was perplexed at all the fuss (you guys are helping). And -PETE WHAT WOULD IT TAKE for me to get my hands on a copy of your Phd. Thesis!? :)) And in general, I think some of my questions about Greek and Jewish traditions/hermeneutics are starting to take the shape of answers. Thanks!

Rodney...sorry you're so confused. I certainly aint' the one to help you on that, although I get the feeling that I'm feeling less confused than yourself. I haven't the foggiest idea why, though. I get the feeling that your mind is connecting to words like "unknown" "indefinable" and "imagination" without enough flight with the mean-ings to which the Ikons point (such as “the unknown” and the whole “overall” “reality” to which the word points that involves a whole web of relationships of existences, appearances and thea-trics). Also therefore without enough weight given to the stories behind the meaning of the terms onto which you are connecting yourself (ex. inde-fin-able and Socrates search for a “perfect” wisdom). Now, when I say "not enough" there I don't mean some sort of "badness", pooh pooh on Rodney; I mean "not enough TO clarify your misunderstanding that I APPARENTLY HAPPEN not to share (I capitalized "apparently happen" as if to say it's just some sort of strange set of circumstances by which I don't seem to be AS MUCH in the dark as you). Because I don't have any of that ENOUGH either (particularly not to lead you out)! Sorry! Maybe you should read about that stuff and then have a conversation with maninthepew, who seems to know a lot :)) Or talk to Christopher some more…

God bless to all,

Jason

[rodney neill]

Chris,

I was thinking of Petes definition of 'event'(in particular fidelity to and longing for the event) from the last engagement in my posts ( I have no idea how Petes concept relates to Badiou)
but thanks for your explanation

I'll be honest - the discussion is now way above my head so I will bow out.
I do want the discussion to be dumbed down- there is a real need for boards like this for a niche academic audience. I will continue to listen to the conversation!!!!!!!

Adios,

Rodney

[Existential Punk]

Hey, i'd really like to see these conversations come down from such an intellectual side so more of us can grasp what is being said and join in on the conversation. To me, all this highly academic talk is equivalent to what i call intellectual masturbation. i thought this site was to bring these kinds of topics down to a level where more people can engage. Am i wrong? i am in no way saying i am stupid and need everything dumbed down, but i am not a highly academic person and get lost in these conversations. Just my observations and thoughts.

Thanks!
Adele

[maninthepew]

Existential punk has a point

Rod

[maninthepew]

To all,

I think many people check in on the site but are put off commenting by the by the academic jargon -apart from Geoff, Pete, Chris (already involved) there is only Jason and Adrian until recently - I have tried to contribute but feel way out of my depth.

I suppose if you want 3 to 4 regulars ( I appreciate you guys enjoy exploring these issues at an academic level) or if you want a wider participation for a non-specialist audience you will have to try and make your posts not so full of philisophical jargon. Otherwise it will just be the 3/4 of you.

[Pete R]

Hey

I can understand your some of your frustrations Existential Punk and Rod, it is easy to slip into a technical jargon, one which, at its best, is able to reduce massive amounts of philosophy into a single word so that one can move on (for instance ‘Onto-theology’ sums up a whole way of thinking by Heidegger on the nature of metaphysics) and at worst excludes people who are intelligent and thoughtful but who have not specialised in the philosophical language (probably for good reason).

If I say something which does not make much sense please ask for clarification for generally the technical terms I use are like a short-hand which can be explained (the inability to read short-hand is no reflection on ones skills at reading English). That being said, I wonder if there is anything left to be said on the mystery of God in this comments section, the point is not that we find consensus but that the positions are articulated in some crude sense (no more can be expected on a comments section). It feels like we may be going round in circles.

In relation to the creeds of the Church I do worry that their construction seems to often be in direct response to what the church viewed as heretical teaching. In many respects the formation of Creed’s seems to me to represent a hardening of a doctrinal interpretation in response to the uprising and hardening of a heresy – fighting fire with fire. I have no problem with this at all, I advocate the creation of Christian interpretive law (which the Creed’s are a strong part) and the need to keep within the law. But I also reserve the right to be an outlaw, and thus, what worries me is the way that the Creed’s can be given some absolute status. Does the Jewish community have creeds? I don’t know, although I would doubt that they play a big part. The Talmud is what matters. Indeed a Jewish parable tells us that two Rabbi’s are having an argument over the correct interpretation of a verse when God, who has listened to this for long enough, comes down, politely interrupts them and says ‘to settle this once and for all I will tell you what it means’. But the two Rabbi’s turn to God and say ‘butt out, you have no more right than we do to interpret this now’ and then continue to debate. The point, I think, is that all have an equal right to interpreting the text and none, not even God, has the right to give the singular meaning. Something which Creed’s may seem to initially have been created to do.

[Jason Hesiak]

"In relation to the creeds of the Church I do worry that their construction seems to often be in direct response to what the church viewed as heretical teaching....fighting fire with fire". I've certainly thought of creeds this way before, but Peter gives a needed affirmation (as with such a view I sometimes felt like a bit of an alien). Thank you.

But then Peter goes on to blow my top with some profound crap that puts me in debt and appreciation to him. Peter - "WHAT WOULD IT TAKE"? :)

[maninthepew]

Pete,

Are you a SCARY OUTLAW tipping your hat to the creeds in a perfunctory manner whilst in realty giving yourself complete and utter leeway to intrepret them any way you want making all interpretations valid because none are invalid ????? (smile)

Rodney

[Jason Hesiak]

If "A confession - maninthepew/Rodney Neill are the same person", then who on earth is this Rod character!?

"Existential punk has a point

Rod

Posted by: maninthepew"

:)

[Jason Hesiak]

The truly dumb questions are comedic sometimes. Rod-ney. Got it. My mind is burdened by another conversation I'm having elsewhere, sorry...sometimes you feel like you're in a dark and narrow tunnel and you're not seeing crap. That's me. Didn't see the "ney" of "Rod-ney". Plus, I was confusing "Rod" previously with another blog by a guy named "Ron".

[adrian]

Dear all,

I think that Rodney and Existential Punk have a point. It's a bad sign when someone clarifies questions about obscure terminology using the same secure terminology; one has to wonder whether the clarification isn't really just a complicated way of inviting the questioner to change his mind without producing any arguments as to why he should.

Let me try with the least amount of jargon to state what I think the issue here is.

We are all familiar with what we would call fundamentalism. All of us or most of us find fundamentalism offputting, partly because fundamentalists seem to be so certain about so much, and not to realize how much mystery there is in the world. This is where postmodernism comes in. For many people who grew up fundamentalist, postmodern theology, or postmodern philosophy of religion, seems to provide a way of bringing the mystery back into our religion, and so of overcoming fundamentalism.

So far so good. But there is a decision to be made. For at this point we come to a fork in the road, and we can take one of two directions.

On the one hand, the switch from fundamentalist postmodern can lead in the direction of saying in essence that any fixed religious creed at all is a problem. One way of spelling out this claim is to say that the very idea of a fixed religious creed that is supposed to be true is an attempt to do violence to God/the Mystery/the Transformative Event, a form of conceptual idolatry that vainly imagines that it can capture the divine in words and formulas.

Peter is obviously a sophisticated thinker who resists being pinned down simplistically. Nevertheless, it seems to me that he wants to go in the first direction I just outlined. Consider for example his approving use of the Jewish parable about interpreting Scripture in his last post to this thread.

What is wrong with going in this first direction? Well, the first problem is that it makes it difficult, at least on the surface, to say that the story of God becoming man, dying on the cross, rising again, and so forth is actually true, in the sense of actually really having happened. What does the first direction make it difficult to tell the Christian story as a true story? I think that the answer is that the first direction is so worried about protecting God from being pinned down by us that it doesn't leave open the possibility that God could identify himself so much with the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus as to make Jesus the actual incarnation of God.

What I'm saying, then, is that a rejection of fixed religious creeds, and so of the idea of true statements about God, leads to a rejection of the incarnation. But of course without the incarnation there is not much left of Christianity in the traditional sense.

Of course, someone might agree with me and think that the end of Christianity in the traditional sense is actually a good thing. Traditional Christianity, this person might say, is really just conceptual idolatry, fundamentalism. The best way for people raised its traditional Christians to get plugged in to the Mystery is to let go of traditional Christianity, our imaginary objector might say.

The problem with this line of reasoning is that it assumes that Mystery=inaccessible to language. But when I say that Mystery=inaccessible to language, I'm making a definite claim about what Mystery is or rather is not like. Not only that, but when I apply this definite claim to criticize religious creeds, I'm using it as a standard for determining what can and cannot be acceptable religiously speaking. But what if the Mystery wanted to identify itself with the life of Jesus in such a way that we ordinary human beings could, with the help of faith, recognize that identification? From this point of view, we would be setting up our own standards for how God can and cannot be mystery in judgment over how God wants us to actually experience his mystery. For the fact that God can be three-personed and yet one, and that one of these persons could be man without ceasing to be God is much more mysterious, much more unsettling to our conceptual schemes, than the idea that God is unable to become incarnate in the sense the traditional Christianity maintains.

So this leaves direction number two, which is not to jettison the traditional Christian creed, not to jettison the idea that this creed is true, but to rediscover a nonfundamentalist way of understanding and living the creed.

All I am trying to say is that it's possible to believe that the Christian story is actually true without being a fundamentalist or a conceptual idolater, because reverence for mystery mystery and commitment to the truth of the Christian story are not enemies, but go hand-in-hand.

Cordially,
Adrian

[Geoff Holsclaw]

adrian, thank you for clarifying what you think is going on and bringing it down to earth. 

concerning the attempt here at this site to have postmodern theory and chruch practice co-relate...I admit it is difficult, but very essential.  As we have all heard, there is a simplicity after complexity, and while we long for the simplicity, we must not scorn the complexity in the name of praxis. 

But coming at these questions as a pastor regularly involved in leading congregational worship as well as personal counselling, I again appreciate the need for what I call 'faithful doubting,' or the ability to questions God and the recieved tradition.  I see this prinicipally in the Psalms which are a dialogue with God concerning life.  I think that most evangelicals can only coherently read about 10-20 Psalms (mostly of which have directly Christological significance), but are utterly lost when it comes to the rest because they cannot enter into the space of questioning God.  But the Psalmist do question:  they question the Goodness of God, the Wisdom of his Creation, the reliability of his covenant, the truth of his promises.  They express confusion and disbelief. 

there are some many people in my congregation who could really start growing spiritually if they would just start yelling at God. 

So, on the practical, pastoral, existential level, I certainly see this as being totally appropriate, and I think Pete does a great job giving people permision to enter into this space (the second part of his book is all about doing this). 

however, I don't want to say that this approach should be made into an epistemology with attending theorist of language and being. 

If we take (as I once did during a severe back injury) 12 asprin a day for a month, my back will feel better.  But after 3 years (which I also did) it starts becoming toxic to other parts of my body. 

The same is true here.  In an attempt to cure fundamentalism we inject deconstructive philosophy, we need to be aware that there are side effects, and I think that Adrain and Jamie Smith are helping point out some of these.

[Geoff Holsclaw]

this might seem off topic, but it is not...

I was listening to Air America (liberal radio) about a campaign to recude global warming, and it commented on the contradictions currently within the Greem Movement (which has also be commented on by the NYTimes and other papers).

Basically there are two groups emerging within the Green movement: those interesting in saving local/regional open areas (wildlife preserves, fish/bird sanctuaries, etc.); and those interested harvesting natural energy.

These two factions, whose explicit goal is to save the environment, are doing it in different ways which actually conflict.

Those wanting to reduce green house gases are exploring wind and wave power (renewable, minimal waster). But the problem is that These types of energy farms make all the conservationists freak out because it might endanger/confuse fish and foul, as well as being a visual eye sore. So conservationist have actually been the leaders in blocking wind and wave farms in the name of saving the environment, what others have been proposing them in order to ease the pertoleum pollution...all in the name of saving the environment.

Does anyone get the feeling that the same thing is happening here?

[Pete R]

Hey all

Just checked in again on this great disscussion. First off, Jason if you would want to put yourself through my phd I am more than happy to send it to you. Secondly I have to say that I stopped reading at the post which said 'It's a bad sign when someone clarifies questions about obscure terminology using the same secure terminology; one has to wonder whether the clarification isn't really just a complicated way of inviting the questioner to change his mind without producing any arguments as to why he should'. Is this a dig at me? I know both EP and Rod well (on a personal level) and hope that they do not think this about me... I have never been into arguments which call into question the motives of the individual... I love the idea of moral accountability, but not on such a forum. I have people at home who have the right to do that. Once my integrity is called into question I am a little unsure what more I can contribute. I am not keen for this comments section to turn into a look at my motives (whether by those who would defend them or attack them). However, it may not have been a comment about me, so if it was not please disregard my concern.

[adrian]

Peter---

No, it was not a dig at you. It was a dig at academics in general, among which I include myself. I presumed that I was one of the culprits in the criticism that the discussion in the last two posts has been too highfalutin.

Anyway, if you read further, you will see that I am questioning your stated position, not at all your motives for holding it, which I assume are good.

Dear Geoff,

I agree with what you say about doubt in faith, although I am not sure I would call it doubt so much as the parrhesia to speak to God as Father, just as we are, without bullshit or obsequiousness. God is God and not some idol we have to be always tiptoeing around on our best behavior for. The model here is Jesus himself: my God, my God, why have you forsaken me?

I think American Christianity in general is infected by an optimism, an inability to deal with tragedy, an inability to let suffering be, which is actually close to idolatry.

For me part of the simplicity-complexity-simplicity model is precisley figuring out how the mystery-side and the proposition-side go together, which is not at all an easy thing to do. I hope I have never given the impression that I think it is.

In terms of the comparison with the environment, I do think that everyone in this discussion is probably more or less on the same page in terms of certain goals---when stated generally. But I also think that it's precisely part of the complexity you talked about that a not always easy discernment is needed between postmodernism enriching Christianity and postmodernism trumping Christianity. Which is not to say that it's not worth engaging with Derrida and co., but just that it is not a tame and easy process---which they would probably be the first to say themselves.

Cordially,
Adrian

[Existential Punk]

Pete, you don't have to worry about me at all. i love and respect you so much and i know you have integrity. i was only having trouble following the academic language/conversation. It's easier when i am 1-on-1 with you then i can ask for clarification in the midst of the conversation right then and there. i'm not sure how you saw me questioning your integrity - you have it mate and i know your intentions are pure! i may not always agree with you, but i would NEVER tear you down! Adele

[Andy]

All,

To run the risk of sounding redundant, I am also enjoying the conversation. Thanks for the challenging dialogue.

I would agree that it seems as though we're arguing two sides of the same coin most of the time...I just happen to prefer Pete's stance because I use similar reasoning and arguments to build bridges with my skeptical, agnostic and atheist friends.

I appreciate the creeds - but I also agree with Rollins' statement when he writes "In other words, a/theology is a soteriological event that "understands that God is testified to in the transformed lives of believers rather than in some abstract doctrinal system."

NT Wright interprets much of Jesus' ministry to be a subversion of the doctrinal system the Jews had built. He subverted their understanding of the Torah, the Temple, land and family...all key elements in the 1st century Jewish worldview.

His call was to live a radically transformed Kingdom lifestyle...right belief was required...but did right belief have to consist of more than a belief in the God of Israel and a belief that Jesus was the long awaited Messiah?

To live out this Kingdom lifestyle - one had to assume these two truths to be true. Perhaps even harder for a 1st century Jew though was dying to centuries of accepted doctrine, rules, etc.

I suspect this call to die to our own understanding of doctrine, rules, etc. is as real today as it was in the 1st century. If this was hard for 1st century Jews - I suspect it's just as hard for 21st century Christians with our polished systematic theologies (or my less than systematic theology which may not be systematic but is equally dogmatic)and all the rest.

So while I read the creeds with gratitude to our Christian fathers and mothers - I also try to hold my (and their) interpretation loosely...praying for wisdom and discernment to see where my beliefs have become stagnant and stale and where my understanding is lacking.

Not sure if I'll be in this same philosophical and theological place five years from now - but it's where I'm at today.

[Existential Punk]

Andy,

I liked what you said and i agree with you. You say it succintly and in a manner easy to understand. THANK YOU!

[John Doyle]

I don't read postmodern writers therapeutically, as some sort of corrective to take in measured doses in order to increase my theological flexibility. I don't need Derrida or Pete Rollins to make me doubt a little; I already doubt a lot.

From where I sit, outside the gates as it were, some of Pete's ideas offer a glimpse of at least one guy's way of believing. Can I imagine a God so different from me that normal human language serves neither to describe nor to communicate? It's one thing to consider such an insight if you're already persuaded about the truth of the historic and Biblical faith, the doctrines, the creeds, the consensus. It's quite something else, perhaps even something hopeful, if you're persuaded about all these things, but persuaded that they're probably false.

Though I've sat this discussion out, in prior posts I've joined in the collective push for writers to clarify their positions. Though we can speak about the same ideas using the same propositional language, even the same theological language, we can engage in discourse from very different points of view.

Now as to the impenetrability of philosophical language, I too find it tough sledding. There are times when using the written word in a different way is part of the message, and the challenge of the reader is to climb into that way of writing. Poetry is the example that comes most readity to mind. It's tough to enter into a "foreign language" in short doses on blogs, but perhaps it's enticing enough to plunge into deeper water offline.

[adrian]

Dear Andy,

Thanks for your clear post. I still disagree that we are just arguing two sides of the same coin, though.

You cite Peter as saying: "God is testified to in the transformed lives of believers rather than in some abstract doctrinal system." Now, what I am calling into question is this language of "rather than," this either or, that opposes transformation against doctrine.

Of course, if doctrine were just an "abstract system," Peter would be perfectly right to say "rather than." But what if that's not the only way of conceiving doctrine? This is the question I have been asking.

We all know that doctrine has been abused in a million ways by Christian pharisees. I'm not disputing that. I'm simply saying that the Christian pharisees were wrong, not because they held doctrines, but because they misunderstood and perverted what holding doctrines means.

The problem is with the bathwater, not with the baby.

Professing a creed means comitting yourself, handing yourself over to, the Reality the creed is about. It is a saying Yes to a covenant. I think this is what Paul means when he speaks of being handed over into the form of Christian doctrine.

Thus, if I profess that Jesus is the Son of God, then I am actually in that act acknowledging Jesus' total claim over my life, which is to say: allowing him to transform me.

Doctrine is not interesting for doctrine's sake, but because it is an answer to the question: who is Jesus, who is transforming me? Jesus is who he is independently of us---and so not every answer to the question about who he is is equally good.

It seems to me that the answer that most truly transcends human thought is to say: "the Son of God who loved me and died for me." Every other answer pales in comparison.

Thanks for the lively discussion.

Adrian

[Pete R]

Hey. Thanks for the clarification Adrian. It didn’t seem to be in the spirit of your posts, for some reason when I read it I thought it was a response to something I had said. If I felt up to it I would now use this as a comment on the nature of language! But I will refrain. Concerning the place of doctrine, in How (Not)… I attempt to work out the relationship between the faith of Christ and the faith in Christ through a reflection on the film ‘Amen’ by Costa Gravas. In short, I argue that doctrine acts as a means of helping us navigate in the world, but that our encounter with the world helps to transform our way of formulating doctrine. This interplay between exegesis (finding meaning from the text) and eisegesis (reading meaning into the text) is, I would attempt to argue, not only tolerated in the text but actively encouraged (‘the law made for people not people for the law’). Doctrine is therefore vital but also must be open to being moulded to new contexts and historical problems. Thus my main critique is against a Pharisaic use of doctrine. Is not one of the problems with the Pharisees as portrayed in the NT that their ideas about the Messiah where so concrete that when the Messiah showed up they failed to recognise it because he was different than their expectations?

[adrian]

Dear Peter,

Thanks a lot for taking the time to respond to my concerns. Let me repeat that it never occurred to me to call your motives into question. On the contrary, you seem like a great guy, and it would be so much better to actually discuss these things in person instead of on the Internet.

I think you and I are on the same page in terms of wanting to avoid Pharisaism. I have the feeling that many of the people, maybe even all of them, who are participating in this discussion are on that page too---probably because they they got a good dose of Pharisaism dumped on them in church growing up. I hope that I've made it clear in all of my interventions that I'm aware of how much damage a certain kind of we’re right they’re wrong churchliness can do and does do to people who want to be able to say yes and amen to everything, as Nietzsche would say.

I'm also in agreement that doctrine is more like a window onto the landscape than the actual landscape itself, so that the better we come to understand the landscape, the more our sense of the window changes. As a Catholic, and one who has read Newman, I'm committed to the idea that the Church continually re-reads its own doctrines in the light of new circumstances---tradition, in other words. And part of the re-rereading is certainly the correction of one-sided emphases that come from having to rule out a heresy (to return to something you said earlier).

The crucial question, though, for me is the way in which our sense of the window chaanges. Because I do think that it is part of the logic of the Incarnation that there can be irrevocable doctrinal commitments that are true. Consequently, the change in question cannot be such that we simply start affirming the opposite of, say, Chalcedon. I guess what I would plead for is the idea that, with each successive re-reading in new context, there is both a continuity combined with a seeing of new depth of meaning that does not contradict the old, but does enrich and refine it.

I guess where I am coming from is that the possibility of irrevocable doctrinal commitments is connected with the logic of the Incarnation. Now, in saying this, I don’t want to deny for an instant what we might call the permanent risk of doctrine---the risk of thinking that the doctrines give us a power over God, rather than seeing that they are a way of acknowleding his power over us. So your emphasis on the ever-greaterness of the Event is important, and I do not want to reject it. It’s just that I would want to press you on whether or not your position ends up opposing the idea of the ever-greater Event to the idea of irrevocable doctrinal commitment. The reason I want to hold those two things together is that I think the logic of the Incarnation requires us to, and that to sever them is to endanger the possibility of the Incarnation.

The problem with the Pharisees in the Gospels is not that they respected the Scriptures as God’s Word, but that they respected them in the wrong way---by clinging to the letter in opposition to the spirit, as Paul says. I think we would agree on that. I guess my point is just that the spirit is not the replacement of the letter, but the fulfillment of the letter---which, as Andy said, includes death of/to the letter. This is the movement from simple to complex to simple that Geoff talked about.

Cordially,
Adrian

[adrian]

Dear Peter,

One more thought. I would see profession of doctrine along the lines of accepting a covenant with God on his terms. An analogy would be committing yourself to marriage vows on a life-long basis.

There's an irrevocability to the marriage vows that corresponds to the fact that marriage is a covenant of mutual self-gift forever with no reservations. But that irrevocability is not opposed to living each new day with your spouse as a surprising event---quite to the contrary, it's you putting yourself irrevocably at the mercy of that event, and of all its surprising implications, till death do you part.

It's a bit like that with the Church's creed: to profess it is like taking a marriage vow to Christ---in fact the profession of the creed originally took place at baptism, which is precisely a commiting yourself irrevocably in a marriage-like way to the God who committed himself to you irrevocably in a marriage-like way.

Here, too, the irrevocability is not about shielding yourself from the surprise of the Event, but exposing yourself to it with no ability to take yourself back.

The idea that doctrine is true in a binding way has here nothing to do with a standing back in false objectivity to master. No, the point is: I can rely totally and in every circumstance on God's self-gift as marriage partner. Propositional truth is inside of the context of covenantal emeth.

Obviously, doctrine can be turned into the opposite, just like the marriage vow can be perverted into an excuse for closing yourself off to your spouse. But that's not what either is necessarily about. Again, the problem is the bathwater, not the baby.

Cordially,
Adrian

[Jason Hesiak]

First of all, "OOOHH! Daddy, Adrian said 'bullshit'!" Second of all, is it bullshit of me to think of much of philosophy throughout all of history as supposedly medicinal? Plato certainly seemed to take that tone, for example. Pythagoras' community, from what I hear, was pretty much a doctors office under a tree or something. Seems like the further we get into history, the more we are attempting to scribe over a fixed object from an archimedian point, the more we loose that sense of the therapy of the tongue. When medival artists would do a drawing or sketch, they would first get a dark/shadowy surface. Then they would grind dry bone and apply it to the surface. Then they would use a style and en-grave into the white of the bone, and the hidden shadows from underneath would make a black line appear. I'm not saying that John Doyle is overscribing. Just saying I think the therapy of the postmoderns is the death of the modern self more than a reminder to doubt, like what Marc Taylor talks about in The Picture in Question: Mark Tansey and the Ends of Representation. I get the sense that helfpful "doubt" is sort of just part of what happens along the way.

And I'm enjoying the conversation. Thanks Adrian for pushing this creed stuff. I'm looking foward to responses...

Jason