The Will to Action

"Why is the Emerging Church drawn to deconstructive theology?"
It's daunting posting on this ongoing topic/theme, after the excellence of related previous posts and I run the risk of repeating them, and undermining them. Also I am at the early stages of my Ph.D research and my thoughts are those of the theological/philosophical neophyte, trying to see the 'wood for the trees', so please excuse my crude conclusiona suggestions.

I'll approach this topic from two perspectives, in terms of 'best' and 'worst'. If deconstructive theology teaches us anything it's that our new theologies, and concomitant ecclesiologies will embody some wonderful new things, as well as drifting into some dire productions (which in any event locates the emerging church in the continuing nature of the historical church).

'At it's Best'
I think Leon outlined this superbly, that deconstructive theology enables us to be open to the 'other', and to take a position of epistemic humility. Whilst deconstructive philosophy has enabled us to unmask the a priori commitments of the church to modernity, theologians like John Milbank (in a non nihilistic and non Heideggerian/Nietzschean way) have so ably shown and unmasked the a priori commitments of secularism to liberal protestant ideals.

Christians are called to search for others not like us, not in aggression (as that destroys our openness and theirs to us) but so that we might hear and assess ourselves in light of others and they may in turn learn from us. This is so unlike pluralism, where consensus is the goal, or as in exclusivism with the crushing of the other into submission.

Within all this openness to the other, and epistemic humility, many of us have been discovering that the church is not the embodiment of truth (as Jesus is the truth and not a possession) but that it is the unique place that embodies the seeking of truth, of Jesus, by the Spirit.

Alongside Lyotard's diagnosis of suspicion towards meta-narratives, we realise there has never been a pure Christian meta-narrative, Christians have always borrowed from the culture around them and constructed a meta-narrative from the things at hand, the knowing of Jesus in the particular (at least that is my conviction). Yet it is this claim which highlights a problem of deconstruction.

At it's worst
Deconstruction has a major flaw, inherent in it's makeup. Whilst Christians confess the particular of following the historical Jesus within changing historical contexts/horizons and traditions, the post-modern philosophers, or maybe more specifically within the neo-Nietzschean of deconstructive hermeneutics, there is little to no possibility that anyone can make any truth claims as a person, institution and organisation.

In the process of deconstruction debate often ends (and the need for ongoing discussion) once the false construction of what we are examining is revealed. There is no will to act at all, with a ‘surface consumption’ of what we have deconstructed, that Baudrillard mapped out so ably in his writing (I posted some thoughts on this here.

The deconstructive view seems to have no room for conflict and debate between claims. Yet whilst using their tools, it's discourse can help theologians remember that we cannot rely too heavily on our systems of thought. With an awareness that our theological constructions are inherent with sin, maybe deconstruction enables us to tread with caution with our assertions. But the power of sin is not just in the systems that are deconstructed but in the people who try to deconstruct!

Deconstructive theology can help us see the 'other', but is often so sceptical that it ends up having no responsibility to act to others, and can appear at best as the playful behaviours of the indulgent middle class, or something far more sinister at worst.

The deconstructive theology can become more about the 'subject' showing off their skills at subversion of the 'object', and their right to do so, than any desire to close of discussion and take action, as agents of the Kingdom for the mission of Jesus.

There is a responsibility to deconstruct, of openness to the other, but also of closing off, to be able to act. Whilst the emerging church finds an openness to the other, and humility in it’s beliefs, it must also learn the process of 'closing off', of moving from abstraction to the concrete, of the nature of action from within this new deconstructive freedom it has found.

Action
And in trying to find a way to do that we might turn to some french philosophers, from the meaningful agency of Bourdieu with his notion of 'tatics' (compared to the nihilism of Baudrillard), and the strengthening of this agency through the actions of 'bricolage' outlined by de Certeau, but that's a topic for another post.

www.jasonclark.ws

Comments

[John T Brittingham]

I really enjoyed your twofold approach to the theological attraction found within deconstruction. In my studies of deconstruction, albeit through a more philosophical than whole-heartedly theological context, I have found the same flaw, the absence of a "will to act." It would appear as though, in deconstruction's movement away from Levinas, it lost some of it's understanding of responsibility towards the other.

However, I've found that there are some who also see this dilemma within deconstruction and have proposed "amendments." Richard Kearney's use of both Paul Ricoeur and Derrida does a good job of combining deconstructive hermeneutics with the hermeneutics of "oneself-for-another." I would highly suggest his book Strangers, Gods, and Monsters to get a more in depth look at this hermeneutical partnership.

[Jason Clark]

Thanks for the feedback John, and the recommendations, I'll take a look at those.

Jason

[len]

YOu brought to mind for me again William Butler Yeats. When the center no longer holds we find ourselves in a strange desert place. Liminality offers many things.. but not direction, and not the will to act. I identify this same paralysis knawing at my bones. As Yeats writes,

"TURNING and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity."

The Second Coming

[Jonathan Erdman]

Jason says...Deconstruction has a major flaw, inherent in it's makeup...the post-modern philosophers, or maybe more specifically within the neo-Nietzschean of deconstructive hermeneutics, there is little to no possibility that anyone can make any truth claims as a person, institution and organisation.

I would have to disagree with this. If this were the case then the quick-and-easy reductio ad absurdum arguments of Derrida's opponents would have had more force. But Derrida (and perhaps others) did not shy away from making truth claims. It is hard to see how anyone could say anything meaningful without staking some claim of truth. So, I am curious about who you are referencing when you say that there is no possibility of persons/institutions/organisations making truth claims.

Your criticism strikes me as the kind of hasty-generalization done by the hard core Evangelicals who wrote reactionary hit pieces on postmodernism and cashed in early by writing books for fellow alarmists. I know that is not your purpose here, but I would simply suggest you are mistaken on suggesting that truth claims are ipso facto eliminated for philosophers who have developed notions of deconstruction.

Jason says...There is a responsibility to deconstruct, of openness to the other, but also of closing off, to be able to act. Whilst the emerging church finds an openness to the other, and humility in it’s beliefs, it must also learn the process of 'closing off', of moving from abstraction to the concrete, of the nature of action from within this new deconstructive freedom it has found.

I don't think that deconstructive philosophy necessarily excludes your point of "closing off" or of "acting." I think guys like Derrida were perceptive enough to realize that closing was a part of openning. I think their point might be more that once we close something it is immediately a candidate for deconstruction. We may close things as a necessary aspect of human experience and institutional establishment, but this closing is what will lead to the deconstructive forces at work.

For example, I might close my opinion on an issue, say on whether or not the United States should have universal health care. I might even start an institution dedicated to the cause. And yet as soon as I close there is the possibility that my opinion and institution can be deconstructed. Frankly, over the course of time I would argue that it should be deconstructed. People, ideas, and institutions are by nature in need of deconstruction. Deconstruction serves a redemptive role. Jesus deconstructed many, many things....

Jason says....But the power of sin is not just in the systems that are deconstructed but in the people who try to deconstruct!

I would suggest that this is all the more reason why we need other believers and the Holy Spirit to deconstruct ourselves on a regular basis.

[Jason Clark]

Len: thank you for the connection with Yeats and the issue of liminality.

[Jason Clark]

Jonathan: I wonder if you even need the reference/allusion to alarmist evangelicals, that aside maybe you can help me here.

1. Deconstructionist Philosophy: if it isn't baised towards bein able to make truth claims, can you reference a few people, and how they establish the possibility of establishing truth?

2. Construction/action: You seem to have missed the other philosophers, I mentioned, and that my argument however poorly put, was a little more nuanced than you suggest :-)

[Jason Clark]

...and Jonathan, I specific in referencing neo-Nietzschean aspects of deconstruction, and I did say we do need to deconstruct, and it can serve a redemptive role, but it is not the only process of redemption, and surely there are limits to it as a hermeneutic?

[adrian walker]

Dear Jonathan,

As I understand it, deconstruction (the philosophy) isn't just the claim that every institution contains the seeds of its own destruction, but also that every statement contains the seeds of its own destruction as well . . . differance=forever putting off presence. So it's not a sufficient answer to Jason to point out that Derrida and co. made "truth-claims"---doing which, as you rightly say, is an inescapable part of the human condition. The question is not whether they make truth-claims, but whether or not their account of truth-claims challenges the idea that truth-claims can be simply true according to the criteria of non- or pre-deconstructionist philosophers like Aristotle. Only once that question is clear (and the answer is yes, non?) will it be possible to carry on the discussion---and the issue then will have to be whether or not WE ourselves think challenging the idea of simply true truth claims is a good idea and why.

Cordially,
Adrian

[Jonathan Erdman]

Jason says....1. Deconstructionist Philosophy: if it isn't baised towards being able to make truth claims, can you reference a few people, and how they establish the possibility of establishing truth?

But in your post you did not question the establishment of truth claims. That is not what I took issue with. You specifically questioned whether or not deconstruction allows for anyone to make truth claims. All I wanted to say is that deconstruction does not mean that one cannot make truth claims, rather it is how one goes about establishing these truth claims that is called into question. The establishment of truth claims goes to the epistemological question. When we go to the epistemological question most po-mo theorists have different answers, but they seem to all take off from Heidegger who questioned how we got sidetracked on the question of knowledge/epistemology and lost track of the question of being. So, you've got different answers to the being/epistemology questions addressed in different ways by different folks after Heidegger. Gadamer, for one, seems to believe in the existence of truth, but emphasises the dialogical method of interaction whereby truth emerges from discussion.

I don't want to be long-winded and rehash all the philosopher's takes on the Heidegger question of being, but they all seem to recognize the contextuality of truth, and the difficulty of extracting truth from context and establishing anything abstract and objective. This goes back to our being questions raised by Heidegger. Being is not so much about essence as it is about being-in the world. The participation, etc. of bumping around and running into things. This goes back to contextuality. Truth, it seems, is more contextually related than we have given it credit for.

I, for one, question the desirability of the Christian faith to completely decontextualize the faith and abstract it into something divorced from the stream of life. What's the point? How meaningful is truth if it has nothing to do with context? At a grass roots level many are disenfranchised with conservative churches who seem more interested in passing down "truths" in the form of doctrinal statements than they do in talking about a dynamic truth at work in a specific context. We have foolishly believed that the possession of true propositions and true moral norms moves a person closer to true living.

[adrian walker]

Dear Jonathan,

You write: "At a grass roots level many are disenfranchised with conservative churches who seem more interested in passing down "truths" in the form of doctrinal statements than they do in talking about a dynamic truth at work in a specific context. We have foolishly believed that the possession of true propositions and true moral norms moves a person closer to true living."

Ok---but someone might object that you are identifying doctrine with an abuse of doctrine, that is, that you are throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

I'm not arguing against context. What I am saying is that, just as there is no cheap grace, there is no cheap contextuality, either. In other words: Is NOTHING significant lost when we give up the idea of trans-contextual truth? Or: is ALL truth contextual?

Those are real questions that have to be addressed---without, of course, embracing the bathwater you rightly want to throw out. All I am saying is: watch out, are you sure there is no baby in there?

Cordially,
Adrian

[Jonathan Erdman]

Adrian,

I'm curious as to some examples of truths that you consider to be purely non-contextual.

[adrian walker]

Jonathan,

I didn't say that there are purely non-contextual truths, but asked you whether you thought that it's philosophically no big deal if there aren't. I guess you don't: why not? Do Plato, Aristotle, etc. have no counter-arguments on this score that are worth dealing with?

Another way of putting it is this: what would be the role of contextuality in establishing the truth about statements whose truth (not whose meaning, or the language they are expressed in, etc.), at least on the face of it, don't seem all that context-bound, like: (1) 1+1=2; (2) the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941; (3) it's wrong to kill gays because they're gay?

Just to be clear: I am not trying to be snide or tricky; I am honestly saying that your remarks about contextuality raise serious philosphical questions that have to be dealt with in a serious philosophical way.

Cordially,
Adrian

[adrian walker]

oops: "truth doesn't," not "truth don't."

[adrian]

Jonathan:

Just one more quick thought: the point is that some people would have trouble understanding what it might mean to say that the truth of 1+1=2 is contextual. And with some reason, since it does seem on the face of it hard to swallow that 1+1=2 is true for any reason other than that, well, one plus one equals two. So how do we answer this difficulty---and answer it, not just by citing a story about the history of philosophy, but by making an argument that addresses the issue in its own right?

Cordially,
Adrian

[Jonathan Erdman]

Adrian says...I didn't say that there are purely non-contextual truths, but asked you whether you thought that it's philosophically no big deal if there aren't.

Let me tweek this a bit and say that if there are any purely non-contextual truths that these truths would be meaningless. This is by definition. The more a truth is abstracted from the context of life the less relevant it would seem to be. This may be one reason why there is very little in Scripture by way of abstracted doctrines. Even God's so-called "attributes" seem to be abstracted from God's experience of interacting with humanity.

So, let's state it this way: Only that which is contextual is meaningful.

[Josh Burns]

Jonathan,

I agree scriptural statements can often be interpretated in a variety of related ways to accomodate the use of symbolism, story etc but surely there must be a set of limits/boundaries to Scriptural interpretation beyond just contextualisation.

Take for example the Christian doctrine of salvation with the richness of the idea of liberation in spiritual, social and political terms. The specifity of this doctrine can be contextualised in different ways and a variety of emphasis according to culture etc but yet do we still with a degree of faithfulness to what Christians mean by salvation as a universal truth claim?

Josh

[Tim McGee]

Jesus is LORD!

Now, couldn't we maintain that this statement only makes sense within a certain context (linguistic, communal, etc), and yet at the same time, that the statement made from (and aware of) its context still concerns everyone (including those outside of the speaker's context)? In other words, I think we can accept what both of you are saying--that salvation is a universal claim, and one that only has sense and meaning within a particularized context.

To broaden it: it may be true that our claims to truth (and concept of truth) are limited to our historical context, yet, from within our context, there is no reason why we can't claim to see things or know things that concern everyone (to bring it all back to the beginning: e.g., that Jesus is LORD!).

[geoff holsclaw]

jason, thanks for the post.

i don't know if anyone else noticed the Wittgenstienian overtone recently developed in this conversation.

Jonathan, when you say that only truths with context's are meaningful, that sound much like Wittgenstein's "meaning is in the use of a word". But this claim is different than Derrida's and deconstruction. "language games" and 'speach act theory' is one thing, deconstruction is another.

Deconstruction (a la Derrida and Caputo) understands language/concepts as essentially 'violent', closing out the Other who might at anytime show up. But Wittgentein would not say this. He would say that all concepts and truths are contextually meaningful within their respective linguistic regions.

To say that Truth is linguistically mediated and always dressed the the garb of context is one thing; but to say that language and our concepts 'necessarily' bar us from Truth is quite another.

I feel that even among much protest, that Caputo and Derrida are much closer to the latter, and for me that is the deconstructive position.

[Josh Burns]

Geoff,

I wonder if the Levinas/Derrida idea of the 'trace' ( a limited or partial vision of something rather than a complete or transparent sense of presence with much left out/remaining as other that cannot be systematized) is a fairer reflection of deconstructions position. In our language/ concepts the trace presents itself rather than complete absence or complete presence.

Such an idea of the trace has a real affinity to negative theology ( God is beyond human language,concepts and experience)

Benson in his book 'Graven Ideologies' states that the notion of the trace lends itself quite naturally to the Christian/Jewish tradition. He cites the OT story of Moses being allowed to see only 'back' of God ie limited vision or trace of God rather than the fullnees of God - in the Exodus story Moses is warned that he cannot see God in all his glory.

Also Derrida states that Justice is ultimately beyond deconstruction -this is done in the name of Justice.

These thoughts are somewhat garbled borrowed fom Bensons book.

Josh

[Jonathan Erdman]

Geoff,

If truth is linguistically mediated and always dressed in the garb of culture, then I think it is reasonable to conclude that this would necessarily bar us from truth. Language and culture and institutions are necessarily closed and limiting. A language has the ability to express some things but not others. Even if we take a beginning course in another language we soon hear our instructor say something like, "Well, we really have no way of accurately representing this in the English language..." Lanuage limits.

Institutions have purposes and missions. They are usually proactive. A corporation exists for a specific purpose. It exists to reach a niche. In pursuing their stated goals they necessarily close off and exclude other missions and other goals. The same would be true with the church. To have a stated goal and to pursue a particular mission we must necessarily close ourselves to other pursuits. To establish a creed will necessarily close us off to the other perspective - to the anti-creed, if you will.

Culture, institutions, and language are by their nature limiting. So, why would we think that it would not limit our ability to get at truth? I'm not sure why this would be a contested issue. There is a violence to this closing off. This is built into the world in which we live. It is neither desirable nor undesirable, as far as I'm concerned. It's just a part of the way we build churches/institutions/cultures/clubs/theological societies/publishing houses/parties/blogs, etc.

I'm not quite sure I understand what the problem is with this perspective. Suggesting we can violently bring closure but still have access to the whole truth strikes me as a bit unreasonable. We want closure, but without the hassles of a limited perspective. Isn't this disingenuous?

[Tim McGee]

You seem to be suggesting that concrete particularization (creeds, communities, institutions, etc) are essentially inhospitable (violent): a concrete identity can only be constructed by violent exclusion. One can only develop a particularized community through a kind of violent closure. Since humans exist only in concrete, particular communities, you take this violence to be natural (it "is built into the world in which we live"). The best solution is to recognize that our closures are limited and contigent, that we don't have access to the whole truth, and thus that the other may still be able to make a claim on us (and hence we minimize the violence inherent in the human situation).

Before I respond, I want to make sure I am actually picking up on the logic of your post.

[Jonathan Erdman]

Tim. I agree. Please continue.

[Tim McGee]

Given that I am following your logic, I want to offer two lines of resistance.

The first would be that your description has to recognize its own particularity, limitation, and violence. Thus, we can ask: why accept that view instead of another?

The second is to redirect your criticism and then offer another view: the attempt to articulate and construct an identity for ourselves as humans may be a violent act, not just against others, but over against God. But we are not left on our own, and thus, through Christ, we can receive an identity that is particular (grafted into Israel) and yet not inherently closed off to the other. I will quote (at some length) part of Dr. Carter's essay, "Christology, or Redeeming Whiteness," accessible at findarticles.com.

"What might have been more richly developed is how Jesus' humanity and, thus, his Jewishness become transparent beyond themselves as they are rapt into the trinitarian taxis (order). That is, as a constitutive feature of the human life of the incarnate Son, the ultimate horizon of Jewish existence inheres in its orientation toward the triune God. What this finally means, then, is that Jewishness, as the history of ancient Israel in Old Testament Scripture attests, is not a citadel to itself. It is an open border, a border open first and foremost, to God-the God who established Israel and dwells among its people. According to the biblical witness, Israel does not establish its own identity. Thus, the meaning of Jewishness, insofar as it is caught up into the divine life in Christ, witnesses to the universal meaning of creation, in general, and human existence, in particular, regardless of the various identity-markers from which creatures might be considered. For neither Israel nor creation establishes their own identities inasmuch as God creates, "dwells" in, and consummates both...."

"One can push the possibilities of this line of reasoning further still. For, reflecting on the significance of the identity of Jesus as the trinitarian Son, one can say that, just as his Jewishness, as a constitutive feature of his humanity, has its meaning in its Marian openness to being embraced by God, so also Christ's divine-humanity transforms the meaning of humanity in its totality. The call of the gospel, then, is for human beings to enter into Christ, whose humanity is open to receive them and, thus, to (re-)name them and to confer a new identity on them as gift. Hence, the Jewish humanity that the triune God receives in union with the trinitarian Son is, at the same time, the humanity that now redemptively receives Gentile-others into itself. Consequently, in pressing this insight theologically, one might say that Jesus' Jewishness is always already positively disposed toward receiving Gentiles. Conversely, it shows that Gentiles, too, are positively disposed for being received by Jesus and, thus, for entering into his Jewish humanity. This mutual disposal of Jews and Gentiles for each other in Christ may serve as a parable both of the way in which God holds nothing of himself back in his positive disposition to receive the world and of the way in which the world finds its own proper identity only in being received in God. The Jewish humanity of the trinitarian Son, Jesus Christ, is analogically central in this reciprocal movement of giving and receiving. Thus, far from being inconsequential, Jesus' Jewish humanity is, in fact, a crucial element in what it means to exist concretely."

Thanks for working through that quote--I know it was long and a bit dense.

[Geoff Holsclaw]

He is Risen!
    He is Risen Indeed!

Jonathan,
Sorry about the long silence.   Preparations for Easter Week consumed most of my time. 

You said, "If truth is linguistically mediated and always dressed in the garb of culture, then I think it is reasonable to conclude that this would necessarily bar us from truth."

Indeed, the very 'reasonableness' of this claim is was is in dispute.   In these postmodern times it does seem 'reasonable', even 'common sensical.'  But linking 'linguistic mediation' and 'cultural conditioning' with 'barring us from truth' is something I'm not willing to do.

It works like this.  Linguistic realistic/representationalist claim that reality is NOT mediated by language, but that rather the Truth is transparent and immediate.  The see any claim of 'mediation' as giving up on Truth.  Deconstructionist agree with them.  But since for them 'mediation' is inescapable, then Truth is lost, leading to the line of thought that linguistic concepts are 'violent'.  The terms of the argument are the same (essentially Enlightenment): Mediation =  No Truth.

But many are disputing this equation claiming instead the mediation does not equal limition, but rather a celebration of our creaturely situation.  We are finite, not infinite in our knowledge,  and  God has given language and culture not as bars against the Truth, but as paths on the Truth. 

This shift is subtle, moving from humiliating about we presume to know, to being humble in what we know; from celebrating all that we don't know, to provisionally accepting and increasing what we know; from marking off the bounds of the unknowable, to walking into ever greater knowledge. 

The shift is really from 'representation (or its denial) of reality' to 'participation and co-creation in reality'. 

As David Fitch has alluded to in the most recent post, Wittgenstein is very helpful in this regard, as is Aguinas. 

[Tim McGee]

Just to clarify my two responses: the second one (with the long quote) isn't an argument against your view. You could choose to prioritize your current view, and thus hold that Carter's position, by establishing a particular identity, is still created through violence. However, that brings us back to my first response, which is, why choose to prioritize that view?

[Katharine Moody]

My PhD explores how truth as a concept is understood by members and friends of emerging Christian communities. I'll be drawing implications for philosophy, theology, and (importantly for the discussion here) politics - hopefully submitting in September 2008.

At the moment I see two interlinking strands developing in terms of philosophy, one being a deconstructionist strand which has parallels in the theology of Jack Caputo. I would argue that, for participants at least, deconstruction does not bracket out a will to action. The connections between deconstructionist theology and activism is something I will be looking at further.

My research blog can be found at opensourceresearch.blogspot.com and I'd welcome comments and suggestions from anyone interested in exploring these issues with me.