Is Slavoj Žižek a Theologian?

Perhaps even asking the question renders meaningless the idea of a post-secular age.  Now it is no longer the theologians versus the secular liberals, nor is it merely a question of secularist making room for religion.  We can't merely designate current theory as post-secular without farther distinguishing how and to way purpose religion has made a return.  But I degress...

Now, of course it goes without saying that Slavoj Žižek has much to say about theology, and even uses theological concepts and codes.  But does that make him a theologian?

My question springs from something Pete Rollins said while describing a reading group he is pulling together which would be "dedicated to introducing and exploring the work of key theorists who are contributing important insights into Christianity."  Now, framed this way, of course I would recommend reading Žižek.  But Rollins introduces Žižek as "a dialectical materialist theologian."  Really?  For me, riffing on the title of this installation piece, I would have to say, "Slavoj Žižek (the theologian) Does not Exist".  

Now I'm sure that many will jump on my intolerant exclusion, my hubristic tendency to police borders and draw lines, my pitiable need for creating Others, Monsters, and Enemies, all of which, they will say, Žižek help us to recognize and overcome.  Well, perhaps. 

But I would counter that by calling Žižek a theologian is to make a huge mistake in either one or two ways.  The first  would be to misunderstand Žižek's project, the other would be to misunderstand theology.  Žižek has been, and it seems always will be, a "fighting atheist" who really does believe that religion in its actual forms, its lived realities (which I hope this site would be about, even if tangentially) is fundamentalist and violent (see he his "Defenders of the Faith" where argues that atheists are the only true practitioners of religion).  For me, Žižek is at his best as a political theorist of ideology practicing a critique of capitalism, and for the most part I choose to walk a great distance with him. But in this way he is functioning as a provocative philosopher (and I'm not saying that while looking down my snobby theological nose).

But the only way to understand Žižek as a theologian is to serious downgrade theology itself, which is the second mistake. If theology is merely the sociology or anthropology of religion run through the Lacanian registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real, then I might as well become a stock broker.  If theology is merely explication of the immanent infinitude of human subjectivity, the void of the cosmos, the height and depth of reality, then let's own up to that (which I believe Žižek has). But if theology is truly about something, someone, transcending reality as we know/perceive/construct it, something, someone, that, yes, stands beyond/above/outside what we can conceive, then it is plain that Žižek is not a theologian, and clearly states as much.  Some version of the latter is what I hope theology is, even in all its apophatic, kataphaic relations, even in all its discursive permutations through the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real.

For these reasons, for me, Žižek is not a theologian.

What have I missed?  What do you think?

Comments

[Peter Rollins]

Hey

Glad I was able to provoke these thoughts with my reading group. Of course, part of the reason for calling him a dialectic materialist theologian, is to stage a short-circuit and blur some distinctions. However this is not justification enough... shouting fire in a cinema is not the same as free speech etc. Alternatively I could try to defend myself by pointing out that Zizek himself uses this term about himself (as far as I can recall, though I can't remember where). But this would fare little better as, if he is no theologian, then he might not be the best person to know that he is not.

Then there is his many works on Christianity and specifically religious ideas. But yet again this is not a productive avenue. Anthropologists of religion etc. talk about religion and are not theologians.

However in this last point I get closer to my reason for choosing to call him a theologian. For in 'The Monstrosity of Christ' we get something more than a philosophy, anthropology, sociology or psychology of religion. It is because of this book primarily that I felt comfortable seeing Zizek in a theological light (which this reading group will focus on). Here we see a work much closer to Altizer and the Death of God theology (though perhaps you would want to distinguish this movement from theology as well) than with Feuerbach and, by extension, most of the liberal sociological descriptions.

He deals with specifically theological concepts in a specifically theological way. Concepts such as Kenosis, Trinity, hypostases etc.

There seems to me something specifically theological about his project (which is shared by others who write specifically about Zizek from a theological angle). Rather than merely commenting on theology or engaging in a hermeneutics of suspicion he seems to be advancing a specifically theological vision. Albeit in the tradition of radical theology.

I can understand your comments, especially if one looks at Zizek up to, and even including, 'On Belief', 'The Fragile Absolute' and 'The Puppet and the Dwarf'. But with 'The Monstrosity of Christ' I think the lines are blurred and a case can be made. Not for Zizek as exclusively, or even primarily, as a theologian. But as a theologian none the less.

What do you think?

[Colin]

"But if theology is truly about something, someone, transcending reality as we know/perceive/construct it, something, someone, that, yes, stands beyond/above/outside what we can conceive, then it is plain that Žižek is not a theologian, and clearly states as much."

Are you saying that one who is not a believer in a transcendent God - particularly of the Christian sort - cannot be a theologian? Altizer and friends may disagree. Even Barth came close when he proclaimed that God's highness or transcendence consists in his descent (as Christ). Of course every materialist is a theologian - what they say about a "something, someone, transcending reality as we know/perceive/construct it, something, someone, that, yes, stands beyond/above/outside what we can conceive" is that it simply isn't there. Your "yes" is just their "no."

[adhunt]

I cannot admit to being in same ballpark intellectually as either of you, and I know Peter you had said you did not find Milbank in "Monstrosity" that engaging . . . but I tend to agree with Milbank when he says

"What matters is not so much that Žižek is endorsing a demythologized, disenchanted Christianity without transcendence, as that he is offering in the end (despite what he sometimes claims) a heterodox version of Christian belief"

[Colin]

Of course Zizek's reply is even funnier - "To put it even more bluntly, my claim is that it is Milbank who is effectively guilty of heterodoxy, ultimately of a regression to paganism: in my atheism, I am more Christian than Milbank."

[adhunt]

Indeed, if not for their brilliant rhetoric I wonder if either would be so enjoyable to read.

[JohnO]

I really enjoyed your last paragraph in the post there about downgrading theology. However, to what end is theology about "sociology or anthropology of religion"?

Do you see it starting there, and moving upwards/outwards? Or do you see it starting out in trancendence and moving down to be about "sociology or anthropology of religion"? Both?

How can we legitimately talk about transendent issues without giving them a concrete foundation, or grounding, in reality?

[Geoff]

Of course Zizek isn't a theologian... he's a 'theologist'. ;-)

[David Fitch]

I personally didn't get the "stock broker" comment. For didn't Milbank say somewhere in the "Monstrosity" volume that capitalism is the only theology true to immanentism? Being a stock broker should be a perfect place from which to do this kind of theology.

[Christopher Roussel]

Geoff,
I've noticed as I've 'switched' from some kind of philosophy to some kind of theology that Zizek (as well as others like Caputo, Kearney, and a lot of the other names associated with those and this group) aren't really considered 'theologians' by the 'theology crowd.' In some ways, I see it as a game of segregation; but it other ways, I see it as sometimes useful. Does that mean Zizek should be discarded? Not at all! I do have to agree with Adam Kotsko that Zizek's thoughts do have applications and appropriations in 'theology.' Perhaps a better question to answer would be 'what is theology?' Chances are, the 'theology crowd' will have a very different answer from the 'philosophy crowd' as well as from this (whatever we are!) crowd.

[Jeremy]

To claim that Zizek is a theologian does not presume that that is his main title. For instance, Mark C Taylor has written about theology and would have to assume the title of a theologian, but clearly his body of work extends vastly beyond the border of theology (e.g. art, architecture, complexity theory, and economics). I would argue that his main project has not to been to work out a theology, but it has been part of his project. Like Altizer, Taylor has advocated an a/theology for the last twenty years as more recently argued in his book After God.
With regard to the Milbank quote about a heterodox theology, sure in many ways it is heresy according to the creeds. But, there's certainly a difference between advocating a theology (albeit materialist) than not being a theologian at all. So, does that suggest if one does not imagine a theology that lies within the margin of orthodoxy that it disqualifies it from being considered theology?

[Adam Kotsko]

Okay, so let's assume you're talking about "theology" primarily in terms of "Christian theology" (which most people do, as is understandable given that arguably no other religion has pushed theological speculation to the insanely baroque levels you see in Christianity). If that is the case, I find it odd that you are defining "theology" in terms of the strictly formal question of "transcendence" rather than in terms of a meditation on the meaning and implications of Christ's work.

If we define "theology" in terms of Christ, then it seems that we're forced to say that yes, Zizek is engaging in Christian theology -- albeit in a heterodox way. And in many cases, I think we'd have to say that Radox types like Milbank are *not* doing theology in any meaningful sense, but rather advancing a philosophical ontology of transcendence with occasional token gestures toward Christ.

Now I should be clear that I ultimately don't think that these labels are very important, and I don't think there's anything insidious about your attempt to apply them (despite your kind of weird preemptive strike on the bleeding-heart liberals who would find your labels oppressive or something). What I do find important is that very bizarre thing that seems to have happened in Christ and in his wake. People who help me, directly or indirectly, to think about that wierd happening in new or more rigorous ways inspire gratitude in me. People who do not inspire boredom and frustration in me -- or in the case of Milbank, both. I think that's probably a more helpful way of divvying things up, if we must so divvy.

[JohnO]

Adam,

I like that distinction, it is very real, not arbitrary as the others are.

[Skip Newby]

Ah! Drawing lines again, and again, and....

Anyone who tries to describe the truely indescribeable is "doing" theology. Butcher, baker, candlestick-maker ~ theologian, philosopher, atheist.

If what someone says disturbs you, and causes you to move toward "being" more like the One Who is Love, then give thanks for them. If not, don't waste your time listening to them, or taking time on the especially wasteful task of categorizing them.

PEACE in Christ.

[Steve Long]

Odd. I must be getting old because what passes for theology these days confuses me. Perhaps the question is what would not count as theology given that it seems everything, anything and most of all -- NOTHING -- can pass for it? Moreover what is the difference between theology and philosophy? Many philosophers speak a great deal about God even in an atheist register, and I have learned a great deal from them. But that would certainly not make what they do theology. It cannot help me pray, worship or be faithful. I take it that theology assumes 'faith' as well as reason, not just 'faith' as some existentialist disposition, but as obedience to sacred teaching that gets passed down and makes a claim on my life. Without that we are not doing theology, we are doing philosophy, a worthy and important endeavor which theology needs and to which it will always bear some affinity. But theology should not be collapsed into it. If theology can 'outsource' all of its work to various disciplines, then we have the peculiarly modern problem, which I think Barth ably identified, that in modernity theology becomes redundant. It doesn't do anything because everything counts for it. Then Fitch is right (and he speaks from experience) -- the stockbroker is the true priest mediating 'materialist' reality and transubstantiating it into an immanentized divine. Now that is truly boring. Most 'death of god' theology simply underwrites it one way or another.

[senseijfk]

I was just blogging on a similar topic: http://senseijfk.wordpress.com/2009/06/24/dynamic-incarnationalism-debate-on-church-and-pomo-blog/

[R.O. Flyer]

"I think we'd have to say that Radox types like Milbank are *not* doing theology in any meaningful sense, but rather advancing a philosophical ontology of transcendence with occasional token gestures toward Christ."

I think Adam nailed it, here. The important question we should all be asking is not whether Zizek (the self-proclaimed atheist) is engaging in Christian theology, but whether Milbank (the self-proclaimed "radically orthodox" bugger) is.

[Paratheo]

Surely to limit theology is to limit God? Even where that limitation is to existence!

[Peter Rollins]

"If we define "theology" in terms of Christ, then it seems that we're forced to say that yes, Zizek is engaging in Christian theology -- albeit in a heterodox way. And in many cases, I think we'd have to say that Radox types like Milbank are *not* doing theology in any meaningful sense, but rather advancing a philosophical ontology of transcendence with occasional token gestures toward Christ"

Like Flyer, I think Kotsko has nailed something very important here (loved your 'Zizek and Theology' by the way). I am very wary of defining theology in terms of some systematic reflection on 'transcendence', particularly in terms of an actually existing supreme being (as Geoff suggests). Rather I too find it more useful to think of theology (which, of course, means Christian theology) in terms of Christology.

[KB]

To be honest, I'm fed up of people being too uptight about what a theologian is. It seems some want them to be high priests - in their ivory towers banging themselves stupid down lightless avenues.

If you talk about God, you're a theologian. End of. There are degrees, of course. There are experts, of course. But part of the sweep of the democratising effect of technology has been to make everyone a designer, everyone a DJ, everyone an artist... and everyone a theologian. What remains is to see whose theology signals stand out from the noise.

[pablo]

we think in language so therefore there is no such thing as transcending anything... everything must be notionally named... postmodernisms fatal mistake.

[geoffrey holsclaw]

Sorry to be absent so long.

Now, surely KB is etymologically correct that whoever speaks of “God” is a theologian. But this would be, and was, the case for natural philosophers in antiquity. To do natural philosophy, even as a materialist, was tantamount to doing theology. It is precisely in this sense that I think Zizek is doing theology via natural philosophy. But after Kant’s investigation into the transcendental conditions for the possibility experience, natural philosophy is distinguished from theology (and in terms of Badious, this event is irrevocable). But following Hegel, rather than Kant, or rather Kant properly extended, Zizek is reintegrating religion into the project of reason. But, and I will stick to this, as least for now :-), Zizek’s theology is that of natural philosophy, except it is now not regarding the unmoved mover or something like that, but rather non-reducible void of subjectivity which can’t be account for in terms of the merely material, yet postulated within a materialism.

For me the real question here is what is the place of Hegel in contemporary philosophy and theology? For Zizek, in “The Puppet and the Dwarf” and even more explicitly in “Mostrosity”, he is articulating Hegelian Christianity.

[geoffrey holsclaw]

But to continue…

Adam is correct that I’m separating out a distinctively Christian theology, which from the beginning separated itself from natural philosophy precisely because of Christology. But I disagree with a bifurcation of all that “seems to have happened in Christ and in his wake” and “a philosophical ontology of transcendence” as Adam suggests, and many affirm. This is patently unbiblical, which is the only source we have ‘Christology’ in the first place. Let us not live in the wake of Christ while falling asleep to the scriptures!

Let’s speak of the “Exodus and everything in its wake” for a moment. For the people of Israel, that their “God” would make a people “out of nothing”, taking them out of the clutches of Egypt, in a political act of creation was equally supplemented by the “myth” that their “God” was indeed the God who not only had made promises to Abraham, but had made all that exists by the power of his word. The Exodus and Genesis narratives certainly make “philosophical ontology” intrinsic to the wake of historical events. The same should be read in regard to the Exile narratives. If a ‘God’ could exile his own people, sending them from the land he promised them, in an act dare we say of Zizekian/Lacanian ‘subjective destitution’ where this ‘God’ has rejected all symbolic ordinates and supports (at least as then thought in regard to tribal and geographic deities), and then this same God re-asserts his existence, persistence, even transcendence, beyond a people and place, this seems to carry “philosophical ontology” in its wake. The same goes for narratives of the live, death, and resurrection of Jesus. For me some form of “philosophical ontology” is intrinsic within the wake of the Christ event, and I don’t believe this obscures or negates the “bizarreness” of Christ, but protect his monstrosity, his otherness.

But we really must stop with this “if Zizek talks about Jesus then he’s doing theology and because Milbank doesn’t then he’s not a theologian.” Direct appeals to Christ, the Real, make things simple, but they may indeed be mere dreams, where as a theology with “token gestures toward Christ” and “philosophical ontology” may actually lead us toward wakefulness in God.

[Adam Kotsko]

I did not intend to suggest a bifurcation, nor to claim that it was impossible that Milbank's work might be helpful for (what I'm calling) theology -- it's just not helpful for me, because I find it boring and frustrating.

I'm not sure what work the Zizekian terms are doing in your account of Israel's history. If anything, wouldn't a Zizekian reading undercut your claim that it all has to be read in terms of transcendence?

[Anthony Paul Smith]

It seems you're confusing Adam's critique of Radical Orthodoxy's untheological character with a prohibition on doing ontology. He's not saying that and your last sentence makes no sense. I'm sorry, it just doesn't.

Steve,

Are you going to give some argument for how death of God theology underwrites capitalism? This seems a really bizarre position to me seeing as death of God theology has literally had no impact on economic policy or structures in the same way, say, the ambiguity of Catholic Social Teaching has or the Religious Right has. I also would love for someone to explain to me how we get from a largely subjective affective state, like boredom, to positing that this is now the absolute truth. I'm thinking of constantly being told that modern philosophy is boring whereas the tradition has the truly exciting stuff. I've read both and, I have to say, I find the tradition to be largely mind-numbingly boring. It may have a claim on my life, what doesn't, but I hardly feel the necessity to defer to it against interesting thinkers like Altizer or Deleuze.

[Erdman]

Has anyone ever asked Zizek what he wants?

Is it his desire to be a theologian?

[geoffrey holsclaw]

adam,
Sorry if I read too much into your comment. Fair enough if you don't find Milbank helpful. I took it as suggesting that those moves might be invalid merely b/c they are not explicitly about Christ

my use of Zizekian terms is to indicate the ambivalence of either atheism or theism. God's 'subjective destitution' might merely be the story we tell ourselves a either a consolation (pernicious religion) or as the revelation of religion in its truth or its concept (manifest religion for Hegel/Zizek). But it might just as well be tell us not merely about ourselves, but about God, which in some way would be an affirmation of transcendence, even if muddled and difficult. What it might mean that God would 'destitute' himself changes according to prior commitments to transcendence or immanence, and how/if the two relate.

anthony,
the last sentence is a word play. From Adam's use of wake as in the spreading turbulence created in water or air from an object passing through, to the state of being awake. Some theological positions make us slow of thought, or sleep; others make us alter, or wakeful.

the use of 'wake' with an object (which creates the turbulence) might be inappropriate if God is the non-object. hence we must wake up (the use without an object). of course a 3rd use of wake would fit a 'death of god' theology such that we are all keeping solemn vigil in honor of one who has passed.

[geoffrey holsclaw]

erdman,

hah! what a great lacanian question. perfect!

[Anthony Paul Smith]

I didn't mean the structure.

[Adam Kotsko]

No, it's fine to be doing stuff that's not explicitly about Christ. That's what "directly or indirectly" is doing in my original response.

To come back around to your original post (you know, since we're talking), I'm also a little confused about what role Zizek's relationship to actual existing church structures is playing in your definition of theology. Yes, he thinks that actual existing Christianity is bad and has betrayed Christ (and Paul) -- but is that such a radical claim, really? Dismissing him out of hand (qua theologian) because of his negative view of church structures seems to head a long way down a slippery slope where theology has a purely apologetic/propaganda role, with no critical edge whatsoever.

Maybe Zizek takes the critical element too far! Fair enough -- maybe he's missing some really great stuff in existing church structures. But that's something that needs to be argued theologically, not asserted axiomatically. And that brings in Steve Long's comments about tradition, etc., which I think tend in a bad direction. Yes, we're all embedded in a tradition/community, but theologians are embedded into the community *in a specific way*, namely as internal critics. There's a necessary element of alienation from the community in the theological task, albeit an alienation *for the sake of* the community (even if the community can't or won't recognize that).

Too much theology that I see thrown around in these circles seems to be asking us to collapse that element of alienation into a simple identification with the community -- as though the big danger facing the church is that theologians will become too arrogant. Back in actual reality, the most potentially dangerous factors are precisely the institutional structures and players themselves. Theologians can provide people with some breathing room and real alternatives when those powers become abusive -- which they do *all the time*, on micro and macro levels. Submission to church authorities is sold as a kind of humility, but it seems to me to be an all-too-easy abdication of the difficult critical and prophetic task of the theologian, whose critical and prophetic message is first of all intended to rouse his or her own community out of their complacency (and *not* first of all to critique all those awful nihilists out there.)

[Steve Long]

Anthony,

The answer is in your own statement: "death of God theology has literally had no impact on economic policy or structures ." Precisely. That is my point. It cannot because it traps us in an immanence which one can only endure, or against which one can only make hopeless critical (pseudo prophetic) gestures; for in the end 'the rational is the actual.' Deus sive natura sive invisibiliis manus sive dialecticus materia. Milbank makes a similar point on p. 198 of Monstrosity. It would be worth considering.

I don't mean to bore, frustrate or provoke a reactive logic from Mr. Kotsko (what would Zizek say?) but I find Milbank's "emanated participation" on p. 201 of Monstrosity, and his account of 'gift without contrast' much more theologically compelling than the 'internal critic' who must always posit a dialectical relation between himself and the community (gift with contrast) in order to arrive at ........? How is that not liberal protestantism redux? I find Milbank's position a reasonable explanation of the central mysteries of the Christian faith -- Trinity and incarnation.

[Matt Norman]

"It is better to be merciful in the name of Buddha than to be cruel in the name of Christ. It is better to become a neighbor with a Samaritan theology then...to desert the beaten victim with a Jewish theology."--from A Spiritualty of the Road, Bosch, pg 37 where Bosh quotes Kosuke Koyama.

[Adam Kotsko]

So we need transcendence to get over the oppressiveness of immanence, but the theologian should be totally immanent to the community? Not sure how both parts of your response hang together.

(And I'm actually a doctor now. And indeed a professor, at least for the next year. Not that it matters in the end, but I might as well claim the title I just mortgaged my life to get.)

[geoffrey holsclaw]

Adam,

I'm glad you successful defended. that is quite an accomplishment (and I'm not being snarky). I hope to arrive in a similar place in a few years.

I don't know if that last comment is aimed at me, but I certainly don't think the theologians should be totally immanent to the community. But a true transcendence seems to be the only way to properly dislodge the theologian, and any ordinary parishioner for that matter. For me, the church community and the world of all those nihilists stand on the same side of the transcendent/immanent divide (i.e. as part of creation), within the saeculum. But only some form of a true transcendence coupled with a non-pernicious historicism (the relation of the finite/infinite, temporal/eternal) can appropriately live with in this tension.

[Adam Kotsko]

Clarification: My last comment was responding to Steve Long.

It's not clear to me why your transcendence is better than my alienation, nor is it at all clear what your notion of transcendence has to do with Christ or what light it can shed on Christ. I mean, I suppose God had to have initially been transcendent in order to undergo the kenosis of incarnation and death -- but doesn't that very act seriously disrupt the order of transcendence? Radox types (and here I'd count both Geoff and Steve Long) seem to use that potential as a kind of ready response when people are too worried about hierarchy, but don't put any emphasis on it when they're doing their positive project -- there it's all about formal categories of transcendence and some kind of stable institutional deposit of the faith. There's no grappling with the cross in any serious way!

I know it's harsh to say it that way, but I think this is a case where harshness is necessary. Zizek is seriously grapping with the cross, however -- it's an area of his thought where you can really see him develop over time, and his multiple books seem to show how urgent it is to him once it gets ahold of him. Here we have a thinker who is trying to take seriously the notion of "knowing only Christ and him crucified." And because he doesn't come up with the predetermined answers, we should dismiss him as part of the dialogue? At the very least, one should carefully consider his arguments against orthodoxy in Monstrosity, arguments that Milbank never addresses in his response.

[mshedden]

Being a lowly pastor my comments will probably be easily skirted but I think some good questions have been raised here over a maybe not so important question.
The question I want to ask is whether one can be a theologian or "know only Christ and him Crucified" separate from the body which he appeared to identify with. Can one be theologian of a religion separate from its practices of belief such as: prayer, baptism, the Lord's Supper, visiting the poor, sick, those in prison etc. (Or if it were a question of Islam the five Pillars might serve the same point.) This is a point I think Sarah Coakley is making as she goes about writing her systematic, and although she may not say it, theology separated from living a life in these ways may not be theology at all.
So Zizek might be raising important thoughts regarding the role Christianity has played in modernity and he does enlist Christ in service towards his particular goals. But I don’t think it would be a stretch to say that those goals would be different if he opened himself up to the practices of the church. How different? I don’t know. But I have hard time envisioning Christ as something to be known separate from the realities he has given us to live in.

[Adam Kotsko]

mshedden repeats a move that I see constantly in these comment threads and that seems to me to be an obvious case of begging the question. Yes, responding to the work of Christ requires some form of communal life -- this much should be obvious. But why this communal life, why the communal life of some particular institution that puts itself forward as being the inheritor of Christ's work? There's a kind of short-circuit at work between the idea of "a church" and the things we happen to call "churches." Why might not a political movement be a more authentic communal response to Christ's work than the kind of thing we call "church"?

Surely this is a theological argument we could have and it may even turn out that my position is wrong in the end. But we'd actually need to put forth arguments, and I rarely see any "church"-oriented types actually putting forth arguments in this regard -- instead, it's just considered axiomatic.

[d barber]

Steve Long -- wouldn't it be most precise to say that what you have in mind is "confessional theology"? That way we get to maintain the proper sense of theology as thinking about God (whether faith or reason it doesn't matter), and you get to keep your restricted sense of theology (now as confessional theology).

And, to Steve, Fitch, etc -- this binary ... the either/or of transcendence vs. stockbrokers, is straight bullshit. There are a vast number of ways that one can refuse transcendence while remaining committed to goods that are irreducible (in fact antagonistic) to the market.

That is really lazy thinking, thinking without virtue.

[Steve Long]

Adam (if I may. I don't think we have met.) Congratulations on a successful defense and even more on finding a position. These are tough times for academics; this is an achievement.

I found geoff's original post both compelling and courageous. I didn't see him simply positing transcendence against immanence; nor did I. He just suggested that if theology is about God, and we understand God as "transcending reality as we know/perceive/construct it," then -- in that sense -- Zizek is admittedly no theologian. I agree. Of course I think both geoff and I have learned a great deal from him and will continue to do so. I agree with geof that"he has much to say about theology," to which we should pay careful attention. For that reason I am puzzled why you seem to counsel that "we should not dismiss him." To disagree is not to dismiss.

Nor is some easy appeal to transcendence being used by either of us as an argument stopper. In fact Milbank's "emanated participation" confuses any easy categories of transcendence/immanence. But here is were I think you and I may strongly disagree. I don't accept the Lutheran crux probat omnia. Jesus was Jewish. Jews already understood God in terms of the first two commandments -- God was not a creature. Interestingly, first century Jews who had this understanding of God worshipped Jesus and offered prayers in his name. They did not think the cross alone determined who God was, but seemed to claim that the God they already knew through the revelation to Moses was now somehow found the Risen Crucified. This does not rule out God's immanence in creation, but it certainly suggests God (YHWH) cannot be emptied into creation nor that the immanent trinity can be collapsed into the economic. I take it that this is what is in part behind geoff's post and that we should not act as if we can do theology without recognizing it. Collapsing the immanent into the economic trinity seems to be a common theme in much contemporary theology. (It seems as though Hegel is everywhere, from barthians to postmoderns to openness and process types.) I don't think that takes seriously the Jewish God found on the cross. I find fascinating Zizek's argument that the cry of dereliction is a kind of atheism -- fair enough -- but Christianity is not tragic. We do not live in Holy Saturday alone; nor only on Golgotha. There is also Sinai and the Garden with the empty tomb. Far from closing down conversation, i think that fuller story opens up all kinds of new economic and political possibilities.

[Peter Rollins]

mshedden

Zizek would agree with you insomuch as he wants a militant community of believers living their faith in Christ. The point is not that he does not believe in concrete practices. Rather he is questioning the concrete practices of the church as it presently is.

To say that one should be engaging in the practices of the actually existing church before he can be a theologian does not provide a space for the one, like zizek, who is saying that many of these practices are not faithful to the event of Christ.

In a way what you say begs the question, i.e. if one assumes that the churches practices are already correct then Zizek is not faithful to Christ. But it is the legitimacy of these practices that he is challenging.

[mshedden]

Thanks for your response Adam and Peter. I didn't intend to ask the question because it is obvious but because I was unclear that it did matter. So thanks for clearing that up.
Yet at the same time I think the problem simply remains that I cannot conceive of a Christianity devoid of what even the gospels would consider some of the marks of the church (most importantly an active life of prayer). If I have missed the point of Zizek argument where he is willing to even attempt these practices then I am sorry but it seems to me his interest is in Christ is only as it points to his political commitments and doesn't threaten his atheism.
The second problem seems to be that when we perceive of a 'Christ event' the way it seems to be being used, it becomes ahistorical event that it primarily comes to mean something being reflected on outside of canon (particularly the Old Testament), church, creed, theology, prayer, worship, etc. The possibility remains that this might be the correct way to conceive of this, I just don’t think it would have anything to do with Christianity then, but rather be its own sort of religion. But at that point I think I would remain within the Christian form, challenging and critiquing it for sure, but not attempting to leave it entirely (which I think Zizek is doing, and most likely aware of it).

[Peter Rollins]

Hey mshedden

This is where it gets interesting as someone like Zizek may want to debate with you as to what is contingent to Christianity (e.g. washing feet) and what is essential (e.g. serving the poor).

One can argue, though they may be wrong, that prayer was culturally taken for granted at the time of Christ (being Jewish in the 1st century), but that it is contingent and thus may not necessarily be part of a faith Christian life in another epoch.

Instead what one could say is that it is the practices which Jesus did that were counter the culture that get to the heart of what might be essential, e.g. seeing the oppressed as the site of liberation.

The point, as I say, is not that prayer is contingent and thus not a substantive element of Christianity at all times (but rather constitutive of Christianity at particular times). Rather the point is that this seems like an eminently reasonable position to argue. If it is, then can we exclude the one who argues it without begging the question?

In terms of your second concern Zizek is actually very committed to the actual event in history and its reading in theology. He rejects Feuerbachian readings that see God as a mere projection etc. and is very committed to the incarnation.

[mshedden]

Peter,
I guess we would disagree on if it is a reasonable position to argue, but I would say I am not trying to exclude him from the conversation.
I would think of him a critic upon which Christian theology must respond and listen rather than an internal practitioner of the faith. In mind this distinction influences how we read his writings, not if we should.
My second concern was more for how it is being used in this conversation than how Zizek might conceive of it. Although in my limited readings of him I would say he leaves himself open to those critiques from what might be considered the 'confessional' position.

[d barber]

"Milbank's "emanated participation" confuses any easy categories of transcendence/immanence."

On the contrary, for Milbank the effects (the participants) do not remain in the cause in the same way that the cause remains it itself. Thus this is clearly a paradigm of the transcendent.

Whereas for immanence, the effects and cause are immanent to one another, such that the effects remain in the cause just as much as the cause remains in itself, they are mutually constitutive.

[d barber]

In other words, the very distinction between an immanent realm over against a transcendent, is already an effect of transcendence. So the fact that Milbank renders porous this boundary between an immanent and transcendent realm does not mean it is quesionable whether he advocates the transcendent. It is just that he has a more flexible version of the transcendent.

[Adam Kotsko]

Steve (here following the blog convention of calling everyone by their first name), I don't see how this post was particularly courageous. He basically defines the term "theologian" confessionally, then finds that Zizek isn't a theologian. Given his definition, the result is completely unsurprising. Even I would be forced to admit, "Yes, if that's what you mean by a theologian, Zizek isn't one."

The only way it could be construed as courageous is if he was making a resolute stand to a presumably hostile audience. But the audience isn't hostile, and his stance isn't particularly resolute -- for example, he hedges with "for me, Zizek isn't a theologian." And he has defenders such as you bizarrely claiming that he's not asserting transcendence, even though he obviously is, both in the post itself and in subsequent comments.

Meanwhile, I'd still be interested to hear a reply to my question about the actual existing church.

[Anthony Paul Smith]

Steve,

You really overload the debate by trying to decide the terms of immanence so that the "rational is the actual" and immanence is some trap, etc., etc. Deleuze's thesis of immanence, and I use him as the most exemplary thinker of immanence (which may, in fact, lead to errors in terms of thinking from immanence, but that's another, more technical discussion), appears to be that there are non-rational elements of reality and many of us see fit to name these spiritual. I take the spiritual elements in Deleuze’s philosophy to be located in the givenness and creation of realities that exist at the sub- and supra-individual level and these realities may not be represented adequately through molar identities but can only be experienced actively (that is to say in a manner that co-constitutes these realities themselves and not as passive receiver which would confuse eminence with immanence) as the immanence of these realities themselves.

Getting from there to a positive social-political project may be difficult, but it seems far more fruitful than the kind of nihilistic humiliation evident in the strange syncretic mixing of certain forms of Roman theology with Platonism. That may not even lie in its being true (though I think it is), but in that it aims to be non-obscurantist whereas the tradition has always aims to cut off the power of revolutionary groups in the name of the "middle way" of orthodoxy and the structures of power it helped create and perpetuate. And this, aside from your misrepresentation of immanence, is why I find your statements against death of God theology to be lacking. Why side with those who oppress through ambiguity against those who attempt to overturn the structures? In short, Dorthy Day has more in common with Altizer than Benedict.

[Adam Kotsko]

I apologize for wasting everyone's time with my previous comment. My annoyance at the claim that writing a blog post could be somehow "brave" got the better of me. If substantive discussion can continue, I'm all for it.

[Mr Andy]

What startled me most about this post was the association of theology with a community, so that it becomes a virtue to include someone in it, and a lack of generosity to exclude them.

Because if Žižek is a theologian, then he's totally safe, like John Milbank, Bernard of Clairveaux, Carl Schmitt and Evagrius of Pontus.

If I was gonna make a wild claim, I would say that this idea of a safe realm of theology is Radox's pipe dream. But I'm too lazy for wildernesses.

[geoffrey holsclaw]

Mr. Andy,

I just re-read my post, and I wasn't the one who brought in the community as an aspect of theology. While I might argue that on a general level, I didn't suggest that above. My construal of theology could be purely individualist as I termed it above.

while admittedly this way not clear, and I'll perhaps attempt a full post to argue this way, but a principle reason for me denying Zizek the status of theology is exactly to protect, even affirm, his status as a philosopher, and his projects as a philosophical endeavor. And again, I believe this is internal to Zizek's program, not just an imposition. Against postmodern ambiguities and infinite deferrals and pseudo-denial (which we get from Derrida, Caputo, and others), Zizek states that he is a "fighting atheist" or "militant atheist". To construe his project as theological, even if you construe theology much more broadly than I have, is to misunderstand what Zizek is doing.

And so I, not merely as a theologian, but as a reader of philosophy, want to read Zizek well, and that means taking him at his word. But this doesn't rule out dialogue or inter-disciplinary work between Zizek's philosophy and theology of any form. Let's just do it well, instead of making Zizek into a mirror of some theological project we are fond of.

It doesn't seem to be a radial claim, or an exlusionary claim, to say something like, "I have used Zizek's philosophy in my theological project" but improper to say that "I have used Zizek's theology in my theological project."

[Mr Andy]

And I didn't say you made the association yourself. Instead, you expect to be accused of ungenerosity, and open for a description of your note as an "exclusion". And that was striking.

But since you press the point, I should perhaps note that I am still bewildered by the need to put people into departments. What value then does being "proper" have in this context? If it's nothing to do with inclusion, why should we make these distinctions if not to appeal to a particular project (and perhaps an orthodoxy)? And does that not unnecessarily restrict Theology's creativity?

These issues make me uncomfortably not least because I have no idea what my own work contributes to others' theological discussion, or whether my stumbling responses to the life of faith can count as Theology. So that I cannot justify my own place in the academy, but am reduced to merely saying "this is what I do."